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Abstract  
  
The purpose of this thesis is it to investigate the socio-political conditions that gave rise to 
right-wing populism (RWP) in Germany and Hungary. It ascertains reasons for increasing 
right-wing populist attitudes in these two countries by tracing the emergence of the German 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the Hungarian Movement for a better Hungary (Jobbik). 
The choice to compare these parties was influenced by considerations relating to their roles as 
main opposition parties in their respective countries’ parliaments as well as the fact that they 
were catapulted to political prominence as right-wing populist parties in the aftermath of the 
refugee crisis of 2015. Examining the causes for the increase of RWP across Europe is 
indispensable for purposes of understanding the everchanging political landscape of the 
European Union (EU) and the continued threat RWP poses to liberal democratic values in that 
region. Furthermore, it is necessary to comprehend the undercurrents besetting the two 
societies’ social fabrics and political nomenclatures as well as their roles in precipitating right-
wing populist movements that have gone on dominate their respective polities. 
To unearth the circumstances behind the rise of RWP as a political phenomenon, the 
Most Different Systems Design will be utilized to identify factors which account for the success 
of the AfD and Jobbik in their respective countries. To carry out this task both the Cultural 
Backlash Thesis (CBT) and the Economic Insecurity Perspective (EIP) are employed as 
theoretical nodal points to ascertain each of the two countries’ unique set of socio-political and 
socioeconomic circumstances that propelled right-wing parties to political prominence. 
This thesis argues that both the CBT and EIP have been at the centre of why right-wing 
populism has been on the rise in the EU in recent times. Accounting for the exponential rise of 
Jobbik and the AfD is the exploitation of growing nationalist sentiments by both parties fuelled 
by fear of the loss of traditional norms and values since the refugee crisis. By focusing on 
traditional values and their countries’ cultural identities, the two right-wing populist parties 
inadvertently exclude minority groups on a continued basis. Furthermore, this study claims that 
while cultural discontents account for the rise of both parties, economic grievances are only 
applicable in Jobbik’s case alone. This is due to the fact that Germany suffers from less 
economic difficulties as EU’s strongest economy, whereas Hungary’s own has been 
performing below par, which has been aggravated by high levels of corruption in the public 
sector. Hence, Jobbik’s rise has been aided by economic and cultural frustrations as a result of 
the so-called foreign infiltration whereas the AfD’s is attributed to growing cultural and 
nationalist grievances gaining a foothold in Germany.  
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Chapter I 
 
Unearthing the circumstances behind the rise of right-wing populism in Germany and 
Hungary 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
As a result of the rise and spread of right-wing populist movements, Europe has experienced a 
political upheaval in recent years. According to Vehrkamp & Merkel (2018), this development 
does not only pose a threat to the political stability of the European Union (EU), it also 
constitutes an existential danger to the organisation’s liberal democracy. Although the rise of 
right-wing populism (RWP) is not a new phenomenon since it already entered the public 
discourse in the mid-1980s, its evolution has reached a new high in recent years. For the first 
time in the EU’s history, a right-wing populist party (RWPP) came into power in 2000 when 
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPA) built a coalition with the Austrian People’s Party (APP) 
after becoming the second strongest party in Austria’s national elections in the previous year. 
Regarded as exceptionally scandalous by many political pundits, RWP was soon classified as 
potentially harmful for the stability of social cohesion and political steadiness in the EU 
(Fallend, Habersack & Heinisch, 2018; Laczynski, 2017).  
In 2014, European RWP reached its height at the European Parliamentary Elections 
(EPE) where RWPPs achieved record results for the first time since they came to vogue 
(Hillebrand, 2015). In both national and international elections, the parties were able to double 
their share of votes within the past 50 years. At the same time, they managed to triple their 
share of seats. Populist leaders of these parties were able to successfully challenge mainstream 
parties and to alter the direction of political competition in the EU. Even in states with a limited 
amount of populist representatives in the parliament, RWPPs have the potential to put pressure 
on the ruling elite, policy agendas and public discourse. In the United Kingdom (UK), for 
instance, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was able to generate public support 
for the country to leave the EU. Consequently, a referendum took place in 2016 that resulted 
in favour of the Brexit (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Besides, RWPPs also gained on popularity 
in countries such as Italy (Lega) and Sweden (Sweden Democrats (SD)) (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 
2018). 
RWPPs pose a significant danger to the current democratic order and the freedom of 
speech (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). Due to their emphasis on nationalism and politico-
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economic isolation, they have the potential to severely impact the political stability of states 
and the quality of their international relations (Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). RWPPs 
manipulate political debates and influence public discourse in their favour by spreading 
prejudices, breaking taboos, using emotionally-charged and provocative language, to mention 
but a few. Thus, they tend to cause divisions in the society and intensify the chances for conflict 
(Hartleb, 2017). Furthermore, RWPPs tend to discriminate against minorities that fall outside 
the mainstream of societies, for instance, Muslims and refugees. (Müller, 2016). Next to that, 
the rise of RWP can also lead to the decline of economic growth rates (Eckert & Zschäpitz, 
2016). According to the European Central Bank, the increasing popularity of right-wing 
movements may result in the delay of important finance and structural reforms. Hence, the 
stability of the financial market and the Eurozone are at risk (Eckert & Zschäpitz, 2016).  
Despite the potential dangers RWP poses to liberal democracy, previous research lacks 
cross-national comparative analyses ascertaining its causes in the EU. Due to the increasing 
success and persistence of European RWPPs, it is indispensable to examine the reasons for 
their popularity. In this regard, this thesis compares the German RWPP Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) with the Hungarian party Movement for a better Hungary (Jobbik). It is 
important to investigate the structural and foundational underpinnings the two RWPPs share to 
identify the key common denominator responsible for their rise and popularity.  
 
1.2 Problem statement  
 
RWP is a pan-European phenomenon that affects the entire EU. Impacted by various crises and 
political upheavals which confronted the EU in recent years, the public discourse shifted to the 
political right allowing for the increasing success of RWPPs. Despite the vast amount of 
literature looking at RWP and its causes, reasons for its popularity across Europe remain 
unclear. Research does not only lack a focus on specific RWPPs and former communist 
countries, it also lacks a comparative analysis between the West and East. This has proven 
problematic as these countries differ in terms of their historical and cultural backgrounds. A 
comparison between right-wing populist movements of different societal and political contexts 
is indispensable to comprehend the parties’ unifying origins and the changes in the social 
nomenclature that gave rise to them.  
Germany, one of the EU’s founding members and most powerful nations, was 
considered immune to RWP until the formation of the AfD in 2013. Nevertheless, the party 
quickly gained on popularity and became the country’s main opposition party in 2017 (Bax, 
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2018) In contrast to that, Hungary, that merely joined the EU in 2004, is governed by the RWPP 
Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) since 2010 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018a). Even though 
Hungary is ruled by a RWPP for around nine years, Jobbik, a party more radical than Fidesz, 
is gaining on public support. As the AfD in Germany, it is the country’s main opposition party. 
Thus, RWP is deeply ingrained in the social and political fabrics of Hungary whereas it is 
regarded as new phenomenon in Germany.  
Although the two nations are impacted by different historical, cultural and economic 
circumstances, they are both confronted with the rising success of RWP and its societal 
consequences. Since RWP poses a sincere threat to liberal democracy by undermining 
libertarian ideals of equality, freedom of choice, social cohesion and economic development, 
this thesis intends to investigate the underlying reasons for its success.  
 
1.3 Aim and significance of the thesis 
 
Rising RWP poses a danger to liberal democracies and economic progress. To identify the 
sources of its increasing popularity across the EU is relevant to avoid both interstate as well as 
intrastate socio-political and politico-economic tensions. Since the research field of European 
RWP lacks a systematic comparative analysis that focuses on its causes, it is important to 
analyse the unifying reasons for its success in the EU. To examine the complexities of the issue 
and to investigate its origins, it is inevitable to compare different RWPPs and the social as well 
as economic conditions that have propelled them. At this juncture, countries from Eastern and 
Western Europe need to be analysed to identify patterns that apply to all EU member states. 
Since Germany differs significantly from Hungary regarding its historical, cultural and political 
background, RWPPs of both countries are selected for purposes of drawing parallels. 
Comparing the main opposition parties of the two countries, the German AfD and the 
Hungarian Jobbik, assists in identifying common factors that account for the success of RWP 
across Europe. This is indispensable to understand its spread and to highlight the potential 
consequences on social cohesion in the two societies. It assists in unearthing the circumstances 
behind the rise of RWP and in descrying the extent to which cultural and economic 
considerations impact right-wing populist attitudes. 
The political context of RWP will be examined by focusing on current trends regarding 
right-wing attitudes, changes in the social fabric and non-partisan ideological orientations. 
Thus, the aim of this thesis is to consider the causes that underpin the rise and spread of RWP 
in Germany and Hungary.  
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1.4 Research question(s)  
 
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following main research question: 
 
1. What accounts for the rise of right-wing populist parties in Germany and Hungary? 
 
To narrow down the scope of this thesis, the main research question is subdivided into two sub-
research questions. This is necessary to further comprehend the popularity of RWP in Germany 
and Hungary and to understand how the rise of the AfD and Jobbik impacts the social fabric 
and political customs of these two societies. 
 
2. What explains the popularity of the AfD and Jobbik within in the wider body politic in 
Germany and Hungary? 
 
3. To what extent is the rise of the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik a result of 
cultural and economic discontentment? 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
 
This thesis argues that both cultural and economic aspects affect the rise of the AfD and Jobbik 
at varying degrees. Whilst cultural and economic cleavages account for the Hungarian case, 
anti-immigrant reverberations (and less so economic grievances) apply for Germany. Hence, 
cultural concerns resulting from the fear of foreign infiltration, which was exacerbated by the 
refugee crisis in 2015, and the anxiety of losing traditional values are affecting the voting 
behaviour of both the German and Hungarian electorate. By directly addressing cultural 
deprivations in their policy statements, the AfD and Jobbik were able to gain political 
popularity in their respective societies. In addition, also economic factors have the potential to 
determine the popularity of RWPPs. Whilst Germany possesses the EU’s biggest economy and 
a strong labour market, Hungary struggles under a weak economic performance that is impaired 
with a high corruption rate and social injustices. On this account, economic grievances are 
wide-spread across the Hungarian population which is why Jobbik’s policies, in contrast to the 
AfD’s, focus on economic aspects in the same way as on cultural grievances. Hence, this thesis 
argues that both economic and cultural deprivations are decisive for Jobbik’s popularity 
whereas cultural concerns determine the AfD’s success. To conclude, both the Cultural 
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Backlash Thesis (CBT) and the Economic Insecurity Perspective (EIP) can account for the 
rising popularity of RWP across the EU. 
 
1.6 Conceptualizing right-wing populism  
 
To examine the rising popularity of the AfD and Jobbik it is essential to conceptualize and 
define the meaning of populism, RWP in particular, as it appears in the EU. The term populism 
derives from the Latin word populus which means nation or population (Hartleb, 2017). From 
an ideological perspective, populism refers to a set of ideas that dovetail with traditional notions 
of democracy (of greater societal participation in decision making processes), its methods and 
procedures (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). It is a thin ideology which regards the “society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the positively 
characterized ‘virtuous people’ versus the negatively connoted ‘corrupt elite’, and which 
postulates unrestricted sovereignty of the people” (Manucci & Weber, 2017: 314). Thus, 
populism operates vertical by standing in opposition to the ruling class and horizontal by 
segregating itself from other groups. Populists claim to know and to represent the will of the 
people (Hartleb, 2017). Their ideology is based on a romantic transfiguration of society. A 
mythos which consists of fiction rather than facts. Its counterfactual assumption is that the 
society is a homogenous construction which acts ethically (Hillje, 2017).  
Populism as ideology is never only anti-educational or opportunistic. It articulates an 
unease regarding the actual societal condition which can be based on legitimate reasons. Hence, 
by its existence, it provokes political consequences and adjustment reactions (Decker, 2004). 
On this account, populism consists of three dimensions: anti-establishment, pro-sovereignty of 
the people and anti-pluralism (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). It is characterized by the regress to 
common sense arguments, the fondness for radical and simple solutions for complicated 
problems as well as by conspiracy theories and enemy concepts. Furthermore, it is provocative 
and emotional, utilizes biologistic and violent metaphors, and creates subjective fears (Decker, 
2004).  
Due to its distinguishing orientation, populism needs to be subdivided into left-wing 
populism (LWP) and right-wing populism (RWP). LWP aims to increase the economic 
participation of deprived population stratums and welcomes everyone who shares its point of 
view. It approaches the elite in the name of disenfranchised groups to achieve social equality. 
RWP, on the other hand, excludes people who fall outside the mainstream of society. It claims 
to represent the interests of the efficient native society by accusing the ruling elite to prioritize 
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minority groups. Minorities can be different assemblies, for example, immigrants, refugees or 
religious groups. Hence, while LWP is inclusive, RWP is exclusive (Bax, 2018). Due to its 
wide scope, RWP needs to be narrowed down in temporal, regional and material respect 
(Decker, 2004).  
This thesis focuses on the German AfD and the Hungarian Jobbik, the main opposition 
parties in their respective countries. Both do not only exclude minority groups but also stress 
nationalist stances. Hence, their policy statements correspond with the given definition.  
 
1.7 The European Union 
 
After World War II, Europe found itself in an exceptional historical situation which was 
characterized by the political and economic demise of the European states, the lack of interstate 
relations and the uprising hostility towards the Soviet Union (Weidenfeld, 2013). To secure 
freedom and to avoid the resurrection of nationalism, which was regarded as one of the major 
causes of conflict, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1950 by 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. It served as the precursor for the 
European Economic Community (EEC) which is based on the Treaty of Rome and facilitated a 
shared trade market. The EEC was soon joined by Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. Subsequently, the Single European Act was developed in 1986 to enable free 
trade across European borders. It later culminated in the creation of a single market. With the 
end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, not only was Germany reunified 
but most European countries began to cooperate closely (European Union, 2019a).  
Against this backdrop, the head of governments of the twelve EEC member states 
established the Maastricht Treaty which came into effect in 1993. The treaty represents the 
foundation of the EU. It is based on three pillars: the European community, judicial coalition, 
and a common foreign and security policy (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Currently the EU consists of 
28 member states which include the UK. Its main objective is the preservation and promotion 
of peace and security as well as the elimination of discriminatory trade patterns. It was created 
with the express aim to promote political governance in Europe. Furthermore, the EU supports 
both globalization and modern technology. It established a monetary and economic union that 
fosters the Euro as currency. The EU’s values comprise equality, human rights and dignity, 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law (European Union, 2019b). Although all member states 
cooperate with each other and have codified their national laws under European law, they 
maintain full sovereignty over their respective territories (Weidenfeld, 2013).  
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1.8 Literature review on the rise of right-wing populism in the European Union 
 
As stated before, RWPPs have been on the rise since the 1980s. First regarded as short-term 
protest phenomenon, the parties have proven endurance and modified the political landscape 
of the EU. To gain an overview of the research field, a comprehensive literature review is 
necessary. It assists in illustrating and evaluating available information about the subject under 
investigation. The literature review aims to analyse and compare previous studies. At this 
juncture, it pays attention to existing knowledge about the rise and causes of RWP in the EU 
and Germany and Hungary in particular.  
 
1.8.1 Literature on economic impacts regarding the rise of right-wing populism in 
Europe 
 
In his account for the causes of RWP, Petersen (2018) places great importance on economic 
considerations such as globalization, cross-border movements of goods and services, as well 
as the transfer of technological advancement. He claims that unemployment and economic 
uncertainty significantly impact the election behaviour of affected people. By analysing 220 
regions in 26 European countries between 2000 and 2017, the scholar identified that an 
increasing unemployment rate is directly associated with the rise of RWP and a decreased faith 
in democratic institutions. Furthermore, he investigated that economic deprivation causes 
RWP. Due to the growing worldwide interconnectedness and new means of technology, both 
the productions factors and the exchange of products modified. To stay competitive, companies 
must reduce their manufacturing costs by, for instance, replacing employees with machines or 
relocating to low-income countries. Thus, employees who are affected by the consequences of 
globalisation turn to RWPPs to secure their prosperity.  
Also, Cuperus (2015) investigated that European RWP is a revolt of human beings who 
feel uncared for. From his perspective, it is not a movement of the poor, but a phenomenon 
driven by the lower middle-class who feels economically pressurized by globalization. He 
claims that European RWP originates from socio-economic fears. Since internationalisation is 
regarded as a threat for employment security, people begin to strive for political alternatives to 
safeguard their economic interests. Next to that, the scholar examined that mainstream parties 
directly contribute to the rise of RWP since they are no longer considered as able to guarantee 
8 
economic security. Against this backdrop, the lower middle-class feels politically alienated 
which is why it turns to anti-establishment parties which operate as representative of the nation.  
In the same vein, Kuleßa and Mühlhausen (2015) argue that a confluence of factors 
have contributed to the rise of European RWP. Similar to the other scholars in this field, the 
researchers found that RWP gained on popularity because of globalization and its associated 
consequences. In the EU, the financial crisis of 2008 played a significant role since it revealed 
the global speculation culture, corruption and social injustices to the public. Hence, people 
began to be weary of political elites. Not only did established parties lose the trust of their 
supporters, the concept of democracy also began to be questioned by the populace. To make 
matters worse, the mainstream parties lived in denial without understanding the seriousness of 
the situation which is why RWPPs were able to exploit existing economic grievances. By 
portraying both globalization and the ruling elite as guilty for newly developed discontents, 
they became attractive for civilians. 
In addition, Wehr (2015) asserts that the EU itself exacerbated the financial crisis. Due 
to the organisation’s comprehensive body of legislation, its member states are not only 
compelled to subordinate their national laws under European law, their coalition is also 
impacted by interstate competition because the EU is lacking clear leadership. Besides, Wehr 
(2015) argues that the civilian population regards the Eastern European expansion of the EU, 
which began in 2004, as critical. For the first time in the organisation’s history, economically 
weak countries joined. Consequently, incomprehension on the part of the Western society and 
a desire for more nationalism developed. Thus, RWPPs became attractive because they 
portrayed themselves as the people’s representatives that address their economic needs and 
concerns.  
 
1.8.2 Literature on the influence of cultural grievances regarding the spread of right-
wing populism in Europe 
 
The assumption that the financial crisis of 2008 accelerated the success of European RWPPs 
is shared by Busch, Bischoff and Funke (2018). They argue that in the course of the worldwide 
economic crisis, that affected the entire EU, economic and social inequalities both between and 
within the member states led to an increased political instability. According to them, the 
following Euro Crisis is considered as a crisis of European solidarity since it made the 
Eurozone appear as a fragile political construct. However, the scholars claim that the scepticism 
towards political regimes also significantly increased with the refugee crisis in 2015. Unable 
9 
to find a solution to which all EU states agreed to, the refugee crisis developed into a European 
crisis of humanitarianism and morality. Thus, the authors say that the interplay of the crises of 
previous years accelerated the economic and social destabilisation of the European society. The 
EU seems unable to deal with the aberration, disappointment and uncertainty of the civic 
population. Its politicians fail to understand the needs of the society and to develop sustainable 
solutions to current issues. Hence, people began to plead for a political turn which is why anti-
establishment parties gained on power. 
Next to that, Bax (2018) identified a cultural split across the EU which divides rich 
countries in the West, for instance Germany and Sweden, from their poorer counterparts in the 
East, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary. While cultural diversity is considered as 
enriching in Western Europe, it is regarded as existential threat for the labour market and social 
state in the East. In accordance with Bax’s (2018) research, RWP adheres to an ethnic 
homogenous illusion which defines identity in terms of religion and nationalism in the East. 
Although, for example, Roma are a long-established ethnic minority group in Eastern Europe, 
they are not socially tolerated. Discrimination and exclusion are the norm. In opposition to that, 
Western RWPPs are more antipathic towards Muslims because they are considered as a 
security danger. Immigrants, who are not of the Islamic faith, are regarded as beneficial if they 
strengthen the local labour market and adapt Europe’s cultural identity. Furthermore, due to 
historical events, open antisemitism is avoided in the West. While Judaism is still regarded as 
critical in the East, Western RWPPs trivialize the holocaust and try to attract Jews by 
demonstrating solidarity with Israel.  
In contrast to the other researchers, Muis and Immerzeel (2017) argue that both 
economic and cultural discontentment fosters the rise of RWP. According to their research, 
European RWP is based on the demand-side as well as supply-side of RWPPs: While the first 
focuses on the grievances of the population, the latter is directed towards political confinements 
and opportunities. With the aid of a literature review, the scholars investigated that the two 
approaches are complementing each other which is why the success of RWPPs is related to 
their ability to address both sides. Hence, Muis and Immerzeel (2017: 912) claim that the rise 
of RWP is related to societal discrepancies whereat the “protest is not ‘unideological’, but 
clearly directed against policies concerning immigration, integration and law and order”. In 
compliance with their findings, supporters of anti-establishment parties are often lacking 
political preferences and values. They are regarded as alienated and non-rational (Muis & 
Immerzeel, 2017).  
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Also Laczynski (2017) claims that both economic and cultural grievances foster RWP. 
In regard to his research, the success of RWPPs depends on their ability to revolt against the 
ruling elite, to represent themselves as ambassadors of the society and to utilize existing fears. 
At this juncture, he asserts that especially the application of fear is decisive since it motivates 
people to advocate for a political turn. Because RWPPs are considered as representatives of 
the population that address existing issues, they emphasize available fears in their favour. 
According to Laczynski’s (2017) findings, right-wing populists base their political agenda on 
four types of fears: The fear of elites who merely focus on their own welfare and for that matter 
forget about the needs of the people. The fear of refugees who portray a danger to national 
identities and the security sector. The fear of a decreasing living standard due to globalization. 
And the fear of modernity that endangers the social order and therewith traditional norms. 
Hence, anti-establishment parties are successful because they directly capture and approach the 
anxieties of the population.  
 
1.8.3 Literature on the increasing popularity of the German party Alternative für 
Deutschland 
 
Despite a widespread expansion in the whole of Europe, RWP has not gained a foothold in 
Germany until the national elections in 2017. According to Bax (2018), populist movements 
are not accepted amid the majority of the population since they tend to discriminate specific 
groups of people. Due to the country’s past and experience under Adolf Hitler that led to the 
demise of its first democracy, RWP is regarded as divisive. With the foundation of the AfD, 
however, a political party established which, for the first time since the 1950s, released political 
space to the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) right.  
In compliance with Lees’ (2018) research, the AfD’s nationwide success in 2017 
portrays a significant change in the German party system. Since the RWPP became Germany’s 
main opposition party, it is not only able to influence the daily tasks of the government in its 
favour, but also disrupts its centripetal and stable polity. The scholar argues that the AfD’s 
popularity is based on its distinct political message that criticises the country’s society that 
supports “the redistribution of power resources across the political system” Lees (2018: 297). 
Furthermore, Lees (2018) claims that the AfD was able to increase its support by creating a 
division between the ruling elite and the nation and by excluding minority groups such as 
Muslims. Hence, it exploited the society’s disenchantment with politics which resulted from 
previous crises that hit the EU: Although “the Euro crisis provided the initial mobilizing 
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impetus for the AfD’s development, […] it was the migrant crisis of 2015 that drove its 
radicalization” and made its rising popularity possible (Lees, 2018: 307). 
  Even though Klein, Heckert and Peper (2018) agree with Lees (2018) that the refugee 
crisis determined the increasing success of the AfD, the researchers investigated that also the 
foundation background of the party is decisive. According to their study, the AfD differs from 
other German right-wing parties insofar as it was founded as laissez-fair party. Thus, due to its 
former civic stance, it is regarded as more respectable than other right-wing parties. Against 
this backdrop, it was able to not only attract support from people of the political right, but also 
from people of the political centre and left. Moreover, the scholars argue that Angela Merkel 
is responsible for the AfD’s rising popularity as well. Their findings show that Merkel’s asylum 
and open-border policies directly contributed the party’s nationalist stance. By criticising the 
government’s welcome culture, the AfD was able to address the anxieties of Germans who fear 
the loss of traditional customs and values.  
To conclude, Klein, Heckert and Peper (2018) as well as Lees (2018) claim that the 
refugee crisis of 2015 was decisive for the AfD’s increasing popularity. Furthermore, they state 
that the party’s former economic stance sustainably impacted its appearance which is why its 
support base, in contrast to other German right-wing parties, is constantly expanding. 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned research does not clarify to what extent cultural and 
economic discontents directly impact the increasing popularity of RWP in Germany. The exact 
reasons for the AfD’s political prominence are unclear. 
 
1.8.4 Literature on right-wing populism in Hungary and the success of Jobbik 
 
According to Becker (2010), Hungary’s political system sustainably changed in 2010 when, 
for the first time since the end of communism in 1989, a RWPP gained a two-third majority in 
the national elections. With the aid of street politics, the conservative party Fidesz was able to 
address the political grievances of the population. Its success was based on both the financial 
crisis and national sentiments. In compliance with Becker (2010: 29), “a concern over the social 
decline of the Hungarian middle and lower classes” paved “the way for the rise of the populist 
right”. Next to that, due to the increase of cultural grievances against minority groups like, for 
instance, Roma, the right-wing Jobbik gained on popularity as well. In virtue of the scholar’s 
results, the party is most successful in regions with high Roma populations which indicates that 
its popularity also results from cultural grievances and antipathies towards minority groups. 
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Jobbik is considered as radical branch of the ruling party Fidesz whose success is based on 
both socio-economic discontents and cultural concerns (Becker, 2010). 
Kim (2016) also states that Jobbik’s popularity is based on economic and cultural 
reasons. Since the RWPP “staged high profile and aggressive demonstrations against the 
established government, corrupt elites, and harsh austerity measures” (Kim, 2016: 349) during 
the financial crisis in 2008, economic policies bolstered its popularity. Moreover, Jobbik’s 
cultural stance towards Roma and Jews positively influences its success. By substituting an 
extreme ethno-nationalism and by emphasizing the distinct features of being Hungarian, the 
party addresses deep-rooted xenophobic attitudes of Hungary’s society. Nevertheless, Jobbik’s 
popularity is also a consequence of its youth approach (Kim, 2016). With the aid of Social 
Media, it was able to create “a vibrant youthful sub-culture primarily based on a community of 
web users” (Kim, 2016: 351). Hence, it is very popular among people aged between 18 and 30 
years. By being active on Social Media, Jobbik directly communicates with its target groups 
and transmits a sense of political proximity. It creates a feeling of social belonging that, in turn, 
results in the institutionalization of support. Thus, it differs from Fidesz because it successfully 
established an online platform that represents the interests of its target groups (Kim, 2016).  
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that the rise of RWP in Hungary results from 
economic and cultural grievances. In addition, Social Media play a decisive role regarding the 
increasing success of Jobbik. Nonetheless, although various researchers examined cultural and 
economic variables, they have not compared Jobbik with a RWPP of another country. Hence, 
contrasting Jobbik with the AfD is essential for purposes of drawing parallels and for 
investigating overall reasons for the increasing success of RWP in the EU. 
 
1.9 Theoretical framework 
 
This thesis draws on the Cultural Backlash Thesis (CBT) and Economic Insecurity Perspective 
(EIP) to account for the rise of right-wing populist movements such as the German AfD and 
the Hungarian Jobbik. Owing to Germany and Hungary’s disparate social and economic 
conditions, using the two theories is important to identify the underlying reasons for the 
increasing popularity of RWP in the EU. Although one theory provides better account for the 
circumstances that gave rise to RWPPs in one country than the other, applying the two theories 
predisposes the thesis to unleash more nuanced comparisons that highlight the differences in 
the social and political nomenclatures besetting fabrics of the two societies. Since the AfD and 
Jobbik place their emphases on cultural and economic aspects in divergent ways, the policy 
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dispositions of the two parties may serve as a reflection of the cleavages that the two societies 
are grappling with. 
 
1.9.1 Cultural Backlash Thesis  
 
According to the CBT, the support of populism is regarded as a social psychological 
phenomenon. It reflects a nostalgic response to the value change which impacted the cultures 
of Western societies beginning in the 1980s (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). After World War II, 
Europeans began to take their lives for granted due to the development of welfare states, the 
freedom between industrialized countries and the economic growth. Hence, instead of worrying 
about security issues, people started to stress their free choice. An intergenerational 
transformation from materialist to post-materialist norms took place. Anti-war movements 
were founded, gender as well as race equality were promoted and minority groups, like for 
instance the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) community, were 
tolerated (Inglehart, 2018). 
At the same time, however, an atmosphere of alienation developed because of the 
increasing number of refugees and immigrants (Inglehart, 2018). Since the end of the twentieth 
century, the EU must deal with a growing rate of foreigners who, in most cases, do not only 
fail to integrate into the labour market but are also unwilling to adapt Western values 
(Ivarsflaten, 2008). Consequently, EU member states such as Germany and Hungary are 
confronted by tensions between value systems that regard pluralism as cultural enrichment and 
world views which consider the same phenomenon as decadence and menace of traditions 
(Rippl & Seipel, 2018). The antipathy towards foreigners intensified with the refugee crisis in 
2015. Due to Merkel’s humanitarian attitude and open-border policy, Germany received more 
applications for asylum than any other EU member state. Increasing xenophobic attitudes 
among Germany’s society were exploited by the AfD that began to agitate against refugees, 
foreigners and the Islam (Busch, Bischoff & Funke, 2018). However, Merkel’s welcome-
culture was not only criticised by many Germans but by diverse international politicians as 
well (Hartleb, 2017). Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s head of government, for instance, calls the 
refugee crisis a German problem. From his perspective, Merkel’s policies endangered the 
European solidarity which is why it is Germany’s duty to solve the crisis alone (Leggewie, 
2017). Also, Jobbik militates against refugees and emphasizes the importance of protecting 
Hungary’s traditional norms (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). Hence, both the AfD 
and Jobbik represent nationalist views by excluding people of different cultures.  
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In compliance with the CBT, cultural and nationalist factors, like the attitudes towards 
foreigners and feminism, impact the affinity to RWPPs (Tutic & von Hermanni, 2018). 
Culturally motivated xenophobic attitudes and a hostility towards strangers are rising in both 
Germany and Hungary (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016) which is why the CBT is applicable 
to both countries. Due to the increasing global interconnectedness, the German and Hungarian 
populations fear the loss of traditional values and moral menace. Especially people of the older 
generation and those who are less secured in society, such as the unemployed and the less 
educated, are afraid of losing familiar norms (Inglehart, 2018). In particular “white men, who 
were once the privileged majority culture in Western societies” tend to lend their support to 
RWPPs (Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 29). With this in mind, this theory claims that RWPPs such 
as the AfD and Jobbik are mainly supported by traditionalists who feel incumbent to protect 
those norms and values they consider sacrosanct to their ways of life. Both parties use cultural 
grievances in their advantage. They capitalize on the political climate that serves as fertile 
ground for right-wing and discriminatory attitudes to simmer. In other words, the rise of RWP 
can be closely linked to fears arising from cultural changes in society. 
 
1.9.2 Economic Insecurity Perspective 
 
In contrast to the CBT, the EIP argues that the rise of RWP is associated with economic rather 
than cultural discontentment. According to Inglehart and Norris (2016: 12), RWP is “a product 
of growing income inequality, grievances among the losers from global markets, disaffection 
with mainstream centre-left parties, and loss of faith in the capacity of the mainstream parties 
to respond to these concerns”. Due to both the technological revolution and globalization, 
economic competition increases which is why the number of human beings who possess the 
necessary knowledge for the modifying labour market declines (Spruyt, Keppens & Van 
Droogenbroeck, 2016). The transformation of the workforce is accompanied by austerity 
policies, the depletion of the welfare state, the decrease of prosperity and the global 
interconnectedness (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). While the service sector increased, the demand 
for old-fashioned manufacturing industries declined. Owing to the technological automation 
that introduced new means of travel, communication and production, companies began to 
relocate and to enter the global market. Therefore, industries are getting privatized and the 
international competition grows. Especially within the EU, internationalization plays a central 
role due to the rise of interstate movements (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Thus, employment 
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opportunities for low-skilled and less educated people are vanishing. The gap between the high- 
and low-income class is expanding (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016).  
Specifically Hungary, the third most corrupted country in the EU, is negatively affected 
by these economic developments (Transparency International, 2019). While Germany 
possesses the EU’s biggest economy (Zolling, 2017) which boasts a strong labour market 
access and a low unemployment rate, its Eastern counterpart suffers from labour shortages and 
social exclusion (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). In light of this, the population of the latter is 
more likely to develop economic grievances which in turn impact electoral behaviour and 
political decision making. Jobbik systematically exploits the economic deprivations of the 
Hungarian society by emphasizing existing nuisances. It does not only hold Hungary’s 
government responsible for social injustices and unemployment, but also indicates how 
economic challenges can be solved (Jobbik, 2019a). In contrast to that, the AfD hardly 
addresses economic grievances in its policy statement. It rather promotes a welcome culture 
for new born Germans to strengthen the country’s workforce (Alternative für Deuschland, 
2016).  
Nevertheless, in compliance with the results of the European Social Survey, “a 
statistically and economically significant relationship between regional unemployment and a 
decline in trust toward the European Parliament and national parliaments” exists (Algan, et al., 
2017: 312). From this it follows that growing RWP is correlated to economic downturns. The 
rise of RWPPs is congruent to the increase of inequality (Inglehart, 2018). Hence, from an 
economic-oriented perspective, economic deprivation and social disparity have an impact on 
the spread of RWP. Because less-educated people are most affected by economic insecurity 
due to the lack of necessary skills for employment, they fear a loss of status (Rippl & Seipel, 
2018).  
 
1.9.3 The salience of the Cultural Backlash Thesis and the Economic Insecurity 
Perspective as theoretical points of departure  
 
Because the German and Hungarian societies distinguish from each other, the use of both 
theories is indispensable to ascertain the success of the AfD and Jobbik against the economic 
and socio-political conditions that propelled them. Whilst Hungary is confronted by various 
economic and cultural issues, Germany is mainly challenged by cultural concerns resulting 
from mass immigration although economic fears exist as well. According to the European 
Parliament (2019a), Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU 
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member state between 2013 and 2018. In 2016 alone, 745,155 displaced persons requested 
asylum. Thus, 59 percent of all applications which were made in the EU in 2016 took place 
within the country. Since most of these refugees do not only follow the Islam, a minority 
religious group in Germany, but also possess a different cultural background and value system, 
xenophobe, anti-Semitic and chauvinistic perspectives, arising from the fear of the unknown, 
are spreading across the country (Schellenberg, 2013a).  
Cultural and nationalist aspects also play a role in Hungary: Due to its unique political 
fabric, the country is considered as one of the most xenophobic nations in the EU (Buring, 
2016). Furthermore, discriminating views against, among other things, the LGBTQ and Jews, 
are wide-spread and emphasized by parties like Jobbik (Human Rights First, 2015). 
Nonetheless, the Hungarian party centres its manifesto not only on cultural but also on 
economic aspects. Because of Hungary’s weak economy which is further degraded by 
governmental corruption, many economic discontents exist among the population. Thus, by 
approaching economic concerns, Jobbik is able to augment its popularity among the electorate 
(Jobbik, 2019a). 
 Although Germany and Hungary are united in their struggle against the increasing 
popularity of RWP, their political backgrounds and developments differ. The examination of 
the CBT and EIP in relation to the AfD and Jobbik’s success is indispensable because the 
theories address diverse grievances that can be found in both countries. Notwithstanding that 
the CBT and EIP apply to the nations in different ways, their evaluation is necessary to descry 
the causes of RWP. 
 
1.10 Methodology  
 
The objective of this section is to introduce the methodological framework which carries the 
thesis. First, the qualitative method of comparison is ascertained to structure the research 
design. Next to that, the relevance of the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) is elucidated 
which is utilized to disclose the complexities of European RWP. Subsequently, the explication 
of the selection bias follows since selecting and applying eligible cases is indispensable to 
generate enough empirical data to answer the research question. Moreover, the material used 
for the analysis is specified. In summary, the purpose of this section is to introduce the method 
used to identify the causes of the AfD and Jobbik’s success. It aims to guide the structure and 
implementation of the research. 
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1.10.1 The comparative approach as analytical tool  
 
Since the rise of RWP is a transnational European political entity, evidence about its causes 
can be best extracted with the aid of a comparative analysis that is a case study in approach 
(Decker, 2004). The qualitative method of comparison is a comparative examination of an 
empirical phenomenon that aims to verify and establish theories about given contexts. In 
political science, comparisons are utilized to investigate differences as well as commonalities 
between diverse cases, to indicate specific features and aberrations, to discover functional 
equivalents, to make predictions and to find solutions to concrete issues (Lauth, Pickel & 
Pickel, 2014). Hence, comparisons assist in addressing complex causalities and in 
understanding the relationship between different factors that impact the political landscape 
(Lim, 2010).  
To answer the research questions, the MDSD will be employed. It assists in comparing 
“countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be 
explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome” 
(Landman, 2000: 27). It aims to identify similarities between diverging cases to explain a 
specific phenomenon which is why it is based on the method of agreement (Lauth, Pickel & 
Pickel, 2014). A different method to the MDSD is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). 
It compares cases that share similar features and common political outcomes. Thus, the MSSD 
targets to identify diverging factors between related cases to declare why they are not congruent 
(Dickovick & Eastwood, 2016). While it is the MSSD’s objective to investigate differences 
between selected cases, the MDSD intends to identify similarities. Since the rise of RWP is a 
pan-European phenomenon and both Germany’s historical as well as political background 
differs significantly from the one of Hungary, the MDSD is most appropriate for this thesis. It 
assists in explaining the causes of RWP in both countries and in identifying the features which 
the AfD and Jobbik share.  
 
1.10.2 Selection bias 
 
Since the case selection determines the findings of a study and the answers to the research 
question, it is crucial to select eligible parties. Otherwise, issues of interference are likely 
(Landman, 2000). Because the MDSD focuses on the comparison of countries that do not share 
any features apart from their political outcome, parties which distinguish significantly in their 
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composition must be chosen (Lim, 2010). The dependent variable, the rise of RWP, which 
results from the explanatory factor is decisive for the selection.  
Unlike previous literature, this thesis is focusing on two RWPPs, the AfD (Germany) 
and Jobbik (Hungary), to identify the causes of RWP in the said countries. The parties were 
intentionally chosen because of their foundation background, political agendas and group of 
supporters since these factors differ from each other. While RWP has been an integral part of 
Hungarian politics since 2010 (when Fidesz entered the parliament with a two-thirds majority) 
(Bax, 2018), Germany only began to grapple with the same issue when the AfD entered the 
parliament in 2017 (Bax, 2018). Against this backdrop, Jobbik’s initial situation significantly 
distinguishes from the one of the AfD: Whereas the AfD is the only RWPP in the German 
parliament, Jobbik is inferior to the RWPP Fidesz. Hence, unlike the AfD, Jobbik does not 
possess the unique selling point of RWP on a national scale.  
Similarly, the two opposition parties have different ideological backgrounds. Jobbik 
was founded as a Conservative Youth Community by patriotic students in 1999. Their aim was 
it to establish a non-partisan organisation of like-minded students who are not only 
disappointed by the ruling government but also by the right-wing parties which existed at that 
time (Jobbik, 2016). In 2003, the movement transformed into the political party Jobbik. The 
party has gained notoriety for its xenophobic attitude, hostility towards the LGBTQ 
community, and anti-Roma sentiments (Human Rights First, 2015). In contrast to Jobbik, the 
AfD was formed in 2013 by conservatives who disagreed with Merkel’s politics. Unlike in 
Hungary, the founding members of the AfD were no students but mainly economic experts and 
former politicians of Germany’s mainstream parties (Bax, 2018). Owing to their disdain for 
the CDU’s centrist direction, they created public unease about the EU, its structure, the 
Eurozone and “Germany’s role as its political anchor and paymaster” (Lees, 2018: 299). In the 
course of the refugee crisis in 2015, the party revised its agenda and began to militate against 
refugees and Germany’s open border policy (Zolling, 2017). Today, the AfD emphasizes 
cultural primacy, rejects the Islam, advocates an anti-immigration policy and promotes the 
traditional family model (Chase, 2017).  
In opposition to Jobbik which is considered as most popular party among university and 
college students (Pirro & Róna, 2018), the majority of AfD supporters belongs to the low-
income class (Bax, 2018). Nevertheless, although Jobbik and the AfD have different contextual 
and foundational backgrounds, they contribute to the rise of RWP in the EU. Both parties 
successfully participated in their previous national elections and became the main opposition 
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parties of their respective parliaments. At this juncture, the parties are selected for this thesis 
due to their diverging features but shared success.  
Since this thesis is merely focusing on the AfD and Jobbik, it is anchored by a cross-
national comparative approach which gives detailed insights into the impacts, forms and origins 
of European RWP. Its level of abstraction is minimised due to its small scope. It allows for an 
in-depth research under scrutiny. Political outcomes that result from focused comparisons are 
configurative (Landman, 2000).  
 
1.10.3 Data analysis and material 
 
To ensure a structured and systematic analysis, it is indispensable to define themes which guide 
the comparison. At this juncture, it is important to analyse topics that do not only cover a big 
scope but also permit a detailed examination to find similarities between the AfD and Jobbik 
that explain their common success. The structural conditions of both countries are examined 
and put into relation to the social fabric and the policy statements of the selected parties. This 
assists in investigating whether cultural or economic grievances foster the popularity of the 
AfD and Jobbik. The longitudinal analysis focuses on developments after the end of the Cold 
War in 1989. Data will be collected from previous elections results, election forecasts, research 
studies, opinion surveys and policy stances of the parties under investigation. Therefore, the 
material of this thesis is based on secondary sources. 
Before comparing the AfD and Jobbik, the two RWPPs will be analysed separately. 
This is essential to investigate the reasons for RWP in Germany and Hungary and to identify 
which features the AfD and Jobbik have in common. Therefore, it is important to not only 
analyse the political appearances and agendas of the parties but also to comprehend public 
grievances and attitudes to retrace voting behaviours. 
 
1.11 Limitations of the thesis 
 
A limitation of this thesis is its limited range. Due to the small number of cases, it merely 
focuses on two parties of two EU member states. Hence, its findings are not representative and 
applicable for the whole of Europe. Furthermore, the study is based on a limited timeframe. 
Developments before 1989, such as the two World Wars and their immediate consequences, 
are not considered even though these might have had a significant impact on Europe’s political 
landscape and thus offer explanations for the popularity of RWPPs. Besides, the thesis is 
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merely based on secondary sources. Therefore, the limitations of the primary research studies 
apply. Due to missing fieldwork, the study depends on existing opinion surveys, electoral 
forecasts and other desktop materials. Hence, the validity of the sources could not be 
individually verified. 
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Chapter II 
 
Right-wing populism and the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany 
 
2.1 Background  
 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), one of the founding members of the EU, has a unique 
history. Formed in 1871 as German Empire, it became the Weimar Republic in 1918, and the 
Third Reich in 1933 under Adolf Hitler, before it was divided into the FRG and the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949. While the FRG became a federal state, the GDR was 
transformed into a communist central state influenced by the Soviet Union. After the fall of the 
Berlin wall in 1989, the FRG reunited with the GDR to become the Germany we know today. 
It is a nation with many different tribes that have existed throughout the course of the country’s 
long and eventful history (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Further, Germany is the European Union’s 
most populous nation, with a population of approximately 82.6 million people (status: 2017) 
who live within a geographic area of 357,050 square kilometres (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018b).  
Despite the country’s experience with right-wing totalitarianism and a history of 
political systems that saw the country divided between East and West, Germany after the 
unification in 1989, has evolved into a federal democratic state that holds general elections 
every four years (Hartmann, 2013). According to Freedom House (2019a), the FRG possesses 
a dynamic society and political culture in which both civil freedoms and political rights are 
ensured. Its constitution is liberal and serves as a necessary bulwark to prevent the country 
from slipping back into totalitarianism. Despite all these positive developments in the nation’s 
polity, right-wing populism has crept up, emerging as a threat that could soon threaten the good 
work done since reunification. 
This chapter seeks to examine the reasons that led to the increasing support for RWP in 
Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It argues that cultural and nationalistic 
factors stemming from the fear of refugees remain key considerations to the rising popularity 
of the AfD on the political landscape of modern-day Germany. The AfD’s rise in Germany 
stands in contrast to Hungary’s Jobbik, whose popularity has been attributed to rising cultural 
and/or nationalist as well as economic grievances (See Chapter III).    
Against this backdrop, this chapter will be answering the following questions: How did 
cultural factors impact the rise of the AfD in Germany? Do economic aspects influence the 
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AfD’s increasing support? How did the social fabric and political configuration of modern-day 
Germany foster right-wing sentiments that propelled the AfD’s rise to political prominence? 
Whilst this chapter argues that cultural grievances have provided fertile ground for the 
spread of RWP in Germany, it does not ignore arguments advanced in favour of economic 
developments to account for the changes in the orientation of the country’s polity. This is 
indispensable since, according to the EIP, economic discontents might not only be decisive but 
are also directly related to cultural grievances (Algan, et al., 2017). Furthermore, Germany’s 
political landscape on a national and European level is scrutinized to put political developments 
into context. Also important, the role of the media and their power to influence public 
perceptions, and thus the AfD’s electoral performances will be elucidated upon. All structural 
conditions of modern-day Germany are considered against the changes in the country’s social 
fabric, the popularity of right-wing politics and the AfD’s policy stances for richer 
understanding of the changing political dynamics. Although the former GDR states still differ 
from their Western counterparts in terms of the level of economic development and political 
attitudes, the post-1989 German society remains united and cohesive, and governed by one 
federal constitution which allows for equal participation in the nation’s politics by all citizens. 
 
2.2 The rise of right-wing populist sentiments and their increasing influence on national 
politics  
 
Angela Markel has been Germany’s head of state since 2005 having come from the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), which forms a governing coalition with the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018b). Although Germany is, in comparison to Hungary (see 
Chapter III), ruled by a coalition of its mainstream parties since 2013, it is characterized by a 
broad political landscape. Next to the governing parties, four other parties are represented in 
the parliament: the AfD, the Greens, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Left. Moreover, 
various smaller parties exist which form part of both the sixteen state parliaments and the 
European parliament (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2019).  
 Germany possesses a vibrant subculture with various networks that are, among others, 
controlled by neo-Nazis (Schellenberg, 2013b). The networks are regarded as national 
resistances which unite radical right groups against perceived state repression. One of 
Germany’s most popular right-wing extremist parties is the National Democratic Party of 
Germany (NDP) which was founded in 1964 by former Nazis. It is particularly successful in 
rural areas and aims to attract students by advertising its policies in front of schools. Similarly, 
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also radical elitist right-wing parties have a long tradition in Germany. Parties like the 
Republican intend to act as a bridge between conservative perspectives and extreme neo-Nazi 
ideologies. Nevertheless, none of these parties were able to sustainably influence Germany’s 
political landscape which is why they are regarded as unimportant on the national level. Hence, 
the Republican was only able to win 7.1 percent of the votes in the 1989 European 
Parliamentary Elections (Schellenberg, 2013b). 
In Germany, right-wing parties always struggled to be accepted as credible due to their 
bad reputation. The country’s constitution does not only undermine National Socialism but also 
defines its democracy as free and defensive. Thus, attacks against its democracy are prevented 
to ensure that Germany does not repeat its Nationalist Socialist history. Nonetheless, despite 
the lack of political power and representation, an increase of right-wing populist attitudes in 
rural Germany’s everyday culture are noticed in recent years (Schellenberg, 2013b). 
The AfD was founded in 2013 amid the Euro Crisis as a liberal anti-Euro-party. In 
2015, it transformed into an orthodox RWPP in the course of the refugee crisis (Hartleb, 2017; 
Klose & Patzelt, 2017). According to the preamble of its official policy statement, the AfD was 
established by various German citizens with different historical, political and educational 
backgrounds as well as experiences. They regarded the creation of the party as necessary 
because they were convinced that Germany’s population has the right for a political alternative. 
An alternative to the allegedly unacceptable behaviour of the political elite that does not only 
break the law and operates irresponsibly but also violates democratic rights. Furthermore, they 
founded the AfD to avoid the re-emergence of old prejudices and hostilities which reportedly 
stem from the Euro rescue fund. The AfD supports the promotion of direct democracy, the 
division of power, the rule of law, federalism, subsidiarity, a social market economy, family 
rights and the conservation of the German culture. In remembrance of Germany’s revolutions 
of 1848 and 1989, it is the AfD’s objective to accomplish national unity in liberty and to 
develop a Europe of democratic states that are sovereign and have a right to self-determination. 
The party intends to preserve a peaceful, democratic and sovereign nation-state of the German 
people which fosters Christian culture, the German language and traditions (Alternative für 
Deutschland, 2016). Apart from that, in comparison to Germany’s mainstream parties, the AfD 
is regarded as a forerunner in approaching Russia. Its members did not only meet Putin’s 
advisors, but also sympathise with his desire to transform Russia into a powerful nation-state. 
At this juncture, they criticize EU-sanctions towards the country and acknowledge both the 
Crimea-annexation and Russia’s military operations in Syria (Reimon & Zelechowski, 2017). 
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 It is suspicious that since the AfD’s foundation in 2013, Germany has been ruled by a 
coalition between the CDU and the SPD. Hence, no major political changes took place since 
its creation. Moreover, despite the AfD’s assumptions, around one third of Germany’s 
population trusts in the country’s mainstream parties. Their trust even increased from 22 
percent in spring 2016 to 31 percent in autumn 2018 (Statista, 2018). Nevertheless, the AfD is 
the first RWPP that made it into the German parliament since 1989. This does not only indicate 
existing political grievances and a lack of representation by the established parties, but it also 
demonstrates that right-wing attitudes became acceptable on a national level. Moreover, it 
signals the wish for a political change and that the party successfully addresses the population 
when criticising the country’s current politics. Although all parties of Germany’s parliament 
are unwilling to cooperate with the AfD due to its radical right stance, its potential to 
sustainably influence the nation’s political landscape is conspicuous since it became the main 
opposition party in 2017 (Lees, 2018). 
 
2.3 Divergent EU sentiments in Germany and the AfD’s political presence 
 
Even though Germany’s prosperity and security are inextricably linked to the success of the 
EU, anti-EU sentiments exist in the country (Leggewie, 2017). Since the AfD was founded to 
oppose Germany’s membership of the EU, it views the regional organisation with scepticism. 
According to it, the sovereignty of the German people is a fallacy as per the terms of the 
Schengen (1985), Maastricht (1992) and Lisbon (2007) treaties all of which prove that 
Germany has lost control of its internal affairs to the European Union (Alternative für 
Deutschland, 2016). The AfD opposes the EU morphing into a centralist federal state and 
rejects the idea of the United States of Europe. Instead, it is for the EU returning to its original 
ways as an economic community with shared interests comprised of sovereign and loosely 
connected states. If it is not possible to put these fundamental reforms into practice, the AfD 
wants Germany to either leave or to completely dissolve the EU. Hence, in contrast to Jobbik 
(see Chapter III), the AfD does not regard Germany’s economic success tied to its membership 
to the EU. Additionally, the party objects foreign paternalism and demands to end the 
‘experiment’ of the Euro (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). According to it, the Euro 
endangers the peaceful coexistence of the nations. The currency fosters jealousy, tensions and 
disputes since it forces crisis-hit countries to follow an austerity policy to remain competitive. 
At this juncture, the AfD argues that Germany needs to end its Euro rescue policies because its 
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citizens are not responsible for the financial problems of other EU member states (Alternative 
für Deutschland, 2016).  
The AfD’s perspective regarding the EU is not a full reflection of general sentiments of 
the German society. Most Germans believe that issues such as unemployment, the promotion 
of freedom and democracy, and the protection of external borders need to gain more attention 
at the European Union level. People who are 55 years of age or older are more sceptical of the 
EU than the younger generation (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). While this is the 
case, the vast majority of Germany hold opposing views: In 2018, 81 percent Germans 
supported their country’s membership (Schulmeister, et al., 2018). These are nine percent more 
than in 2014 (European Parliament, 2015). Furthermore, 66 percent of all citizens argued that 
Germany benefits from being part of the EU in 2016, 76 percent in 2018 (Schulmeister, et al., 
2018). Around 78 percent consider their national interests as protected (Schulmeister, Defourny 
& Maggio, 2018).  
Hence, an increasing acknowledgement towards the EU is evident which is why most 
Germans disagree with the AfD’s conviction that the EU needs to be fundamentally reformed. 
Instead, they appreciate the EU’s values. Germans cherish the free movement of travellers 
which gives them not only the chance to visit other member states without a visa but also to 
work and study there (Schulmeister, et al., 2017).  
In the main, the majority of the German society disagrees with the AfD’s policies 
concerning the EU. Anti-EU sentiments seem unlikely to foster RWP in the country due to the 
organization’s popularity amongst most of the population. It is only those marginal European 
grievances among the said population group that have given rise to the AfD in the first place. 
 
2.4 Complex socioeconomic conditions and German society’s attitudes towards 
immigrants 
 
The rise of the AfD on the political scene is as complex as the nature of socioeconomic 
circumstances that have confronted Germany in recent times. Despite it being a wealthy 
society, Germany does not have a perfect socioeconomic score that is devoid of undercurrents 
of social discontents. Since its reunification in 1989, Germany transformed into an economic 
powerhouse that possesses the EU’s strongest economy (Zolling, 2017). According to the Index 
of Economic Freedom (IEF), Germany is considered as a mostly free country, ranking 24th in 
the world and 14th in Europe (Index of Economic Freedom, 2019). The competitiveness of its 
economy cannot be doubted, including business and investment freedoms and entrepreneurial 
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drive that can be rivalled by few in the EU (The Heritage Foundation, 2019a). The minimum 
wage per hour, which was implemented in 2015, is constantly rising. Germany supports global 
commerce and offers a wide range of up-to-date, well-functioning services in its financial 
sector (The Heritage Foundation, 2019a).  
In this context, as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) identifies, Germany is 
regarded as almost corrupt free. In 2018, it was recognized as the world’s 11th and the region’s 
(Western Europe and the EU) 8th corruption freest country. Germany’s government supports 
anti-corruption implementations which is why it established an institutional and regulatory 
framework. Hence, authorities have the power to not only detect but also to prevent and tackle 
corrupt acts (Pawelke & Mendes, 2017). The strength of its economy has enabled the country 
to perform well in the Social Justice Index (SJI) overall. With 6.71 points, Germany ranks on 
the 7th position within the EU and it is placed in the top ten in four out of six categories 
(Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). It does not only possess the organisation’s second-best health 
system but also labour market access with the second lowest unemployment rate. In addition, 
discrimination is relatively low within the wider German society and social cohesion remains 
intact. In spite of this, immigrants face injustices relating to lack of educational and 
employment opportunities, an unsurprising reality as the country scores poorly in the EU for 
educational justice (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). Due to the increasing number of foreigners 
who are seeking employment as well as education since the refugee crisis in 2015, reforms are 
necessary if the country aims to achieve broad-based integration (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 
2017). This vision remains a pie in the sky as some quarters of the German society – particularly 
the less educated – view the so-called foreign infiltration as a potential threat to economic 
security (Busch, Bischoff & Funke, 2018). 
Nevertheless, compared to Jobbik (see Chapter III), the AfD’s success is not based on 
economic discontents. It can be said that the party’s popularity sparked in 2017 two years after 
it became a fully-fledged right-wing populist party following the adoption of nationalist stances 
that sought to galvanise society against refugees. This shift in approach facilitated its entry into 
the German parliament for the first time in 2017 (Cantow, Fehndrich & Zicht, 2017). 
Furthermore, the AfD hardly touches economic grievances in its policy statements. Even 
though the party advocates for a minimum wage and a guaranteed minimal pension for all 
workers (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016), it lacks strategies that aim to foster economic 
development. The AfD has neither plans regarding the creation and security of labour nor does 
it show intentions to reduce existing social inequalities such as the access to education 
(Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). 
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2.5 Cultural concerns and the fear of foreign infiltration 
 
Although Germany is generally tolerant of people from different backgrounds, the country is 
not spared of people with xenophobic, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic and chauvinistic views 
(Schellenberg, 2013a). Since today’s FRG was merely reunified in 1989, political attitudes 
between East and West Germany differ with the former more intolerant to immigrants. Many 
people from the former GDR are still dealing with economic and social challenges which are 
in many ways a consequence of communist rule. Due to transculturation and the transformation 
of values after the end of the Cold War, East Germans tend to be more sceptical towards 
globalization and migration than their Western counterparts (Schellenberg, 2013a). They 
regard immigrants as more problematic. Even though less people in East Germany have an 
immigration background, more human beings fear foreign infiltration. Not only was the 
movement Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident founded in Dresden 
in 2014, also mass demonstrations against Merkel and her refugee policies were first organized 
in the East in 2015 (Ruhstorfer, 2017; Zolling, 2017).  
Nevertheless, due to the increasing number of immigrants and the various terrorist 
attacks which hit the EU since 2015, people in the West became critical towards cultural 
changes and foreign merits as well. During the past few years, a Social-Darwinist discourse 
established which defames minority groups. This development was already induced in 2010 
when the former SPD politician Thilo Sarrazin published the book Deutschland schafft sich ab 
(Germany is abolishing itself). Despite its critical assumptions which define human beings in 
relation to their intellectual skills, ethnicity, religion and value for society, it became 
Germany’s most successful political book in one decade (Schellenberg, 2013b).  
This development was compounded by the refugee crisis. Between 2013 and 2018, 
Germany received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state. While the 
amount of applications constantly increased, it reached its peak in 2016 with 745,155 requests. 
Thus, 59 percent of all applications which were made in the EU in 2016 took place in the 
country (European Parliament, 2019a). Due to the high rate of foreigners entering Germany, 
many locals fear an increase of domestic terrorism. Six out of ten Germans are concerned about 
the rise of immigrant related crimes and three out of ten that cultural diversity results in a 
declining living standard. According to 67 percent of the population, the EU must take more 
action to handle the refugee crisis (Poushter, 2016). 
 Due to the refugee crisis and the increasing number of foreigners entering Germany, 
the AfD began to adopt more anti-immigration stances in 2015, as shown in the previous 
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section. For the party, multiculturalism is a danger for the continuation of the nation as a 
culturally cohesive society which is why the German culture must be preserved (Alternative 
für Deutschland, 2016).  
The AfD argues that foreigners merely migrate into Germany’s social system and low wage 
sector to exploit the nation’s prosperity (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). The AfD believes 
in the modification of European law to regain Germany’s national sovereignty and to prevent 
a mass immigration (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). It regards the EU’s protection of 
Europe’s external borders as insufficient for the protection of the country’s borders (Alternative 
für Deutschland, 2016). Although the party supports freedom of religion, it has a disdain 
against the Islam which is, as it believes, a danger against democracy, German law and Jewish-
Christian culture (Alternative für Deuschland, 2016).  
 Germany has an ageing problem, a challenge which has prompted political parties (with 
the exception of the AfD) to be in support of the immigration of qualified personnel to work in 
the industry (Schellenberg, 2013b). The AfD, on the contrary, claims that the birth rates of 
native Germans need to rise. According to the party, recent years demonstrated that 
immigrants, Muslims in particular, lack quality education that corresponds to the German 
standard and economy. To make matters worse, the birth rates of Muslims are higher than the 
ones of Germans which is why the ethnic-cultural alteration of the society gets intensified and 
the overall level of education decreases. In compliance with the AfD, the attempt to compensate 
for labour shortages with more immigration is dangerous because of the unwillingness of many 
to integrate which is why parallel societies develop (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Thus, 
the RWPP campaigns for a welcome culture for both new-born and unborn Germans, not 
foreigners. (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). Next to that, the AfD aims to end the 
emigration of qualified Germans. Instead emigrants need to be motivated to return (Alternative 
für Deutschland, 2016). 
 Nevertheless, although right-wing populist attitudes and hostilities towards immigrants 
are wide-spread in Germany, RWPPs are regarded as unacceptable by many due to their 
connection to Nazism. Many citizens support a pluralist democracy because of the country’s 
history. People do not only accuse radical groups of the right spectrum but also anti-
immigration parties like the AfD whose politicians have been accused of committing anti-
Semitic offences (Schellenberg, 2013b). AfD politicians such as Alexander Gauland have 
trivialized the time of the National Socialism, arguing that Adolf Hitler and the National 
Socialists are merely “bird shit” in 1,000 years of successful German history. Although he 
admits that the country is responsible for the time between 1933 and 1945, he emphasizes that 
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its glorious existence lasted longer than “damn twelve years” (Fiedler, 2018). Besides, he 
demands that Germany’s population should be proud of the achievements of German soldiers 
in both World Wars and that the time under Hitler is inconsequential to Germany (Fiedler, 
2018). 
 Although RWPPs lack credibility among most Germans, the AfD is able to address 
cultural grievances deriving from the refugee crisis. The high rate of foreigners entering the 
country since 2015 resulted in both security-related concerns and the fear of losing traditional 
values. As Jobbik in Hungary (see Chapter III), the AfD exploits existing anxieties in its favour 
by approaching cultural discontents in its policy statement. The 2017 national elections as well 
as the electoral forecasts beginning in 2013 confirm this assumption. Not only did the party’s 
popularity significantly increase with the beginning of the refugee crisis, the AfD also managed 
to enter the German parliament for the first time in 2017 as main opposition party. Thus, 
cultural grievances bolstered the AfD’s rise to prominence. 
 
2.6 Zooming in further on the AfD’s rising popularity 
 
In Germany, national elections take place in a four-year cycle. Hence, the AfD competed in 
two elections for the Bundestag since its foundation. Whilst it received 4.7 percent of all votes 
in 2013, its support increased by 12.6 percent in 2017 (Cantow, Fehndrich & Zicht, 2017). 
Thus, as Jobbik in Hungary (see Chapter III), the AfD is currently Germany’s main opposition 
party. Also, on a European level it was able to improve its electoral performance. While the 
party got 7.05 percent in the 2014 EPE, it augmented to 10.97 percent in 2019 (Cantow, 
Fehndrich & Zicht, 2019). Nevertheless, it received less votes compared to the national 
elections in 2017 and was outvoted by the Greens in 2019. Hence, it became Germany’s fourth 
strongest party on a European level. The election result might be connected to the fact that the 
AfD is neglecting the climate change (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). This is insofar 
problematic as the climate is dominating Germany’s public discourse since at least the Fridays 
For Future demonstrations which were initiated by the Swede Greta Thunberg in 2018 (Axel 
Springer SE, 2019a).     
The findings of the election results, however, do not give reliable information about the 
AfD‘s continuous performance. Rather they provide an overview of the party’s popularity at 
one moment in time. Against this backdrop, all election forecasts at a national level between 
2013, the year the party was founded, and 2018 were analysed.  
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Figure 1: Electoral forecasts AfD (Zicht & Cantow, 2019) 
 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the AfD was able to expand its electoral support since its foundation. 
It continuously increased with one exemption: In 2017, its overall percentage dropped from 
11.79 to 10.04. This is significant as it represents the year the national elections took place in 
which the AfD received 12.6 percent. The overall picture illustrates an upward trend. Its biggest 
improvement occurred from 2015 to 2016 when Germany received more applications for 
asylum than any other EU member state. Hence, its success is most likely related to the refugee 
crisis and the cultural grievances that followed. With 14.21 percent of potential votes in 2018, 
the AfD was able to increase its popularity significantly compared to 2013 when it merely 
received 3.44 percent (Zicht & Cantow, 2019). The significant gain of endorsement indicates 
future success.  
Figure 1 illustrates that economic factors are unlikely to determine the AfD’s success 
since the party increased its popularity after it transformed from an anti-Euro to an anti-
immigration party in 2015. This assumption is confirmed by Figure 2 which indicates the 
number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants entering Germany between 2013 and 
2018.  
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Figure 2: Immigration into Germany: Number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants 
from 2013 until 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a, Statista 2019) 
 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the number of immigrants constantly increased from 2013 until it 
reached its summit in 2015 with more than 2 million people moving to Germany. It sharply 
increased from 2014 to 2015 due to the beginning of the refugee crisis. Subsequently, the rate 
of foreigners entering the country decreased slightly, still being above 2014 numbers. Thus, 
the number of migrants rose in previous years. This statistic does, however, not clarify whether 
the immigrants are permanently residing in Germany or whether they are merely coming for a 
temporary stay. Furthermore, it does not indicate how many foreigners left Germany at the 
same time. The immigrants shown in the figure include EU-nationals, refugees and people 
originating from outside the EU (Statista, 2019).  
As the number of immigrants, also the amount of asylum seekers persistently increased 
since 2013. Nevertheless, it reached its peak one year later in 2016 when Germany received 
more applications for asylum than any other EU member state with 745,155 requests (European 
Parliament, 2019a). In contrast to the immigrants, the number of asylum seekers merely 
includes people who are non-EU-nationals with the majority originating from Islamic 
countries. Besides, it only comprises displaced persons who apply for asylum not all refugees 
who have been recognized in the host country as such. Since the rate of immigrants entering 
Germany decreased from 2015 onwards whilst the number of asylum seekers increased until 
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2016, it can be concluded that the percentage of non-EU nationals moving to the Western 
European country augmented. 
In contrast to the number of immigrants and asylum seekers, the rate of refugees that 
are recognized in Germany is still rising. Since 2013, more refugees are entering the country 
every year. Most of them are Muslims originating from countries outside the EU. Thus, due to 
this positive trend, it can be assumed that the number of refugees did not reach its peak yet. 
However, even though the number of refugees is constantly rising, Figure 2 depicts that less 
people are applying for asylum (European Parliament, 2019a). 
 Figure 2 illustrates that the AfD’s success is mainly based on the refugee crisis rather 
than on immigrants in general. The party’s popularity significantly increased in 2016 when the 
number of asylum applications reached its summit. Furthermore, its continuous support results 
from the constantly augmenting numbers of refugees entering the nation. Hence, the AfD’s 
focus on Muslims and non-Europeans bolstered its prominence. Because Germany was directly 
impacted by the refugee crisis, the AfD was able to address the cultural grievances of concerned 
people (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Whilst around 80 percent of Germans are afraid of losing 
their country’s national identity and culture, 44 percent believe that too many foreigners live 
in the country (Hetzer, 2015). From this it follows that existing cultural discontents, not 
economic concerns, are decisive for the AfD’s increasing popularity. 
Besides, media directly influence the AfD’s electoral performances. Although mass 
media have been capitalizing on the offensive utterance of the AfD in their reporting, they have 
been an indispensable tool for its success (Bax, 2018). Especially television talk shows made 
the party popular. Although these shows are limited in terms of form and content, they reach 
millions of recipients and assist in inadvertently spreading the AfD’s political stances (Kemper, 
2013). Moreover, the RWPP is able to enhance its image with the aid of Social Media. Not 
only does it possess various Facebook-Accounts, it is also active on Twitter, Instagram and 
YouTube (Alternative für Deutschland, 2019) 
In 2018, three of ten eligible voters had a populist attitude in Germany. Hence, as the 
AfD’s success shows, the country’s climate is increasingly becoming nationalistic (Vehrkamp 
& Merkel, 2018). When analysing the social profile of Germans who support the AfD, it is 
important to note that they originate from all social classes. Regarding the level of education 
and income, they tend to be either above or underneath German average. Thus, their economic 
situation is not decisive (Decker, 2006). People with radical right attitudes support the AfD 
because of its far-right ideology and voters of the political centre due to its populist stance 
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(Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Every forth supporter of the party and 77 percent of non-voters 
regard it as extremely right (Wagner, 2018).  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The AfD’s success is based on various developments within the German social fabric. The 
party successfully exploits the fears of the German population around immigration and the 
potential cultural changes it brings to the contemporary German society. Despite its xenophobic 
attitudes, its electoral performance, with a significant increase in 2016 when most applications 
for asylum were made, demonstrates that many Germans are attracted more by its nationalistic 
stance rather than other considerations such as economic grievances which are absent from the 
party’s policy stances. 
Nonetheless, the RWPP’s political understanding is characterized by several notable 
contradictions. On the one hand the AfD states that the climate change is a myth and that 
renewable energy is unnecessary and on the other one it emphasizes the importance of 
environmental protection (Alternative für Deutschland, 2016). It positions itself as a 
representative of the people that argues against the ruling elite. The phrasing of the AfD’s 
policy statement depicts that the party does not fear the use of offensive phrases like ‘the Islam 
does not belong to Germany’. Hereby, it is suspicious how often the Islam is mentioned in the 
manifesto while other from Christianity distinguishing religions are not stated. Hence, various 
statements, as for example that the Islam is not compatible with Christian traditions, are insofar 
questionable as also other persuasions exist. Muslims are not only accused of a low level of 
education, an unwillingness to integrate and an inability to adapt to Western cultures, but also 
of portraying a security threat.  
 The AfD distinguishes between the nation and the ruling elite since the latter is 
responsible for all existing grievances. It fancies itself as the custodian of German interests and 
thus feels morally incumbent to assume the role of ‘protecting’ Germany form foreign 
meddling and its potential to intrude and harm its sovereignty and culture. For the AfD, 
multiculturalism and European paternalism are destructive to the German way of life and 
certain quarters of the population are weary of this intrusion, and so significant is their concern 
that the said party ended up entering parliament as the main opposition party following the 
2017 elections.  
The RWPP is not wholly opposed to the EU, but it wants the institution to transform 
into an economic community of independent member states that have respect for each other’s 
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sovereignty. It wants the EU to concentrate on the economic aspects of regional integration and 
not to act as a political superstructure that imposes its rules and laws over the individual 
member states. In the main, it is keen to facilitate Germany’s exit from the EU provided that it 
does not reform and consider the possibility of becoming less politically intrusive in the internal 
affairs of individual member states. The AfD does not countenance cultural integration, nor 
does it appreciate the idea of German borders being opened for the exploitation by refugees. It 
is important to take note also, that Germany’s position as the economic powerhouse of Europe 
fuelled anti-immigrant sentiments as well as right-wing populism during the refugee crisis of 
2015. These sentiments look set to continue as long as the AfD views the EU and refugees as 
the problem. 
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Chapter III 
 
Right-wing populism in Hungary and the rise of Jobbik 
 
3.1 Background  
 
In contrast to Germany, Hungary joined the EU in 2004 (Szegö, 2005). Whilst Germany has 
more diverse radical and cultural demographic, Hungary’s society remained homogenous 
throughout its history (Taschen Atlas, 2007). Hungarians, who are also called europei di case 
(Latin for Europeans by chance), originate from former Asian war and nomadic people 
(Hauszmann, 2004). While the country’s territory was ruled by Ottomans in the 16th and 17th 
century, Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy from 1867 until 1918 
(Taschen Atlas, 2007). In 1949, the nation transformed into a republic under a totalitarian one-
party system before it became part of the Soviet Union in 1956. After the fall of the iron curtain 
in 1989, Hungary retransformed into a republic which was followed by the adoption of a new 
constitution (Szegö, 2005). The country has a population of about 9.79 million people (status: 
2017) that are spread over 93,028 square kilometres. From this it follows that eight times more 
people live in Germany although its area is merely 75 percent bigger (Auswärtiges Amt, 
2018a). 
 As a parliamentary democracy Hungary is considered to be enjoying a modicum of 
political freedoms although the country has been experiencing a downward trend recently. 
Right-wing populist parties dominate the political landscape of Hungary, with Viktor Orbán’s 
Fidesz, a RWPP itself, at the helm of government. Since Fidesz’s victory in 2010, both the 
opposition and parts of the civil society have felt intimidation from the new government, which 
resulted in a significant reduction of political dissent (Freedom House, 2019b). Even though 
Hungary has been governed by a RWPP since 2010, the country’s opposition party Jobbik 
began to gain popularity since its founding in 2003, only becoming the main opposition party 
in 2018. Thus, it seems like right-wing populists do not only dominate the political landscape 
of modern-day Hungary, they have also become an insidious feature of its social fabric. 
This chapter investigates the socio-political conditions behind the rise of RWP in 
Hungary. It argues that, compared to Germany’s AfD, cultural and economic discontents have 
been integral to Jobbik’s popularity. The chapter aims to answer the following questions: What 
role did economic and cultural concerns play in Jobbik’s rise to political prominence? Which 
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social conditions directly impact the party’s success? How do the social fabric and political 
configuration of Hungary foster Jobbik’s popularity? 
Whilst it is argued that mainly cultural aspects foster the rise of RWP in Germany, in 
Hungary’s case, and Jobbik to be specific, both cultural and economic grievances have been 
equally decisive in the rise of right-wing populism. Against this backdrop, not only will the 
country’s political landscape and stance towards the EU be analysed, but also its economic and 
cultural challenges. Moreover, both Jobbik’s media usage and electoral performance are 
examined for richer understanding of the party’s popularity and the media’s – particularly 
Social Medial – role in that regard. As in Chapter II, the structural conditions that underlie 
shifts in the country’s social fabric will be put within the political nomenclature of modern-day 
Hungary. A similar attempt will be made in the case of Jobbik as the chapter undertakes to 
decipher the meaning behind the party’s political utterances and the extent to which they either 
feed into or reflect the preponderance of RWP in Hungary.  
 
3.2 Lacking confidence in political leadership and the rise of Jobbik 
 
Since 2010, Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) is head of Hungary’s government. Although the country is 
ruled by one party in lieu of a coalition, its opposition consists of six different parties and one 
independent delegate. As the AfD in Germany, Jobbik is the main opposition party in the 
country’s parliament, followed by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in terms of 
popularity. The other represented parties are the Democratic Coalition (DC), the Politics Can 
Be Different (IMP), the Together and the National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary 
(MNOÖ) (Auswärtiges Amt, 2018a). Hence, like Germany, Hungary is a multi-party 
democracy that reflects the country’s diversity of political views.   
 Compared to Germany, RWP is deep-rooted in Hungary. Far-right groups came 
immediately into existence after the end of communism. Since they were able to gain foreign 
support, they represent the origins of Western fascist organisations (Kovács, 2013). In the case 
of Hungary, the year 2006 was watershed for RWP when the former social-democratic prime 
minister Gyurcsány admitted that he only won the previous elections by lying to the population. 
Various street protests were organized, and right-wing extremism gained on popularity. When 
Orbán received a two-thirds majority in the national elections in 2010, he began to retransform 
the state: Not only did he, among other things, establish a new media law but also changed the 
constitution to ensure his power. For instance, Orbán disempowered the constitutional court 
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(Hartleb, 2017). Due to its anti-democratic political stance, Fidesz was suspended from the 
European People’s Party (EPP) in March 2019 (Beckmann, 2019). 
However, Jobbik’s roots are firmly embedded in Christian student activism of a 
conservative kind before transforming into a fully-fledged political party in 2003 (Human 
Rights First, 2015). Founded as response to the lack of the perceived neglect of Hungary’s 
national interests by existing political parties, Jobbik sought to be the champion of social justice 
as well as the preservation of national values and the Hungarian way of life (Jobbik, 2003). 
With its radical, populist and divisive ideological disposition, the party has managed to gain 
popularity amongst young voters, a reality that is set to increase yet further. It is no surprise 
that the relationship between Fidesz and Jobbik has become adversarial with the latter accusing 
Fidesz of deliberately abusing its power to weaken the strength of opposition parties as well as 
creating a hostile political environment for parties that are intent on challenging its popularity 
and decisions (Bayer, 2017).  
 The challenges relating to attempts by the ruling party to curtail opposition parties have 
added to the trust deficit in the country’s political institutions already plaguing the Hungarian 
society dating back to the end of the Cold War when the then socialist government was found 
guilty of corruption and falsehood (Leggewie, 2017). Currently only a meagre 17 percent of 
Hungarians trust their political parties while 78 percent have lost trust in them. Thus, despite 
Fidesz’s re-elections since 2010, the majority of Hungarians have no confidence in it 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Compared to Germany’s AfD (as shown in Chapter II), Jobbik 
experienced different governments since its foundation and is part of the parliament for a longer 
time. However, although it also is the country’s main opposition party, it lacks the AfD’s 
unique selling point. While the latter is the only RWPP in the German parliament, Hungary is 
ruled by the RWPP Fidesz. Nonetheless, Jobbik benefits from the more populist stance of its 
society. Whilst most Germans regard RWP as critical, it has become part and parcel of 
Hungary’s political landscape which is why its citizens are less hampered to declare their 
support. 
 
3.3 The role of the European Union 
 
Unlike the AfD (see Chapter II), Jobbik does not only harbour negative sentiments towards the 
EU since Hungary economically benefits from its membership. Although Hungary’s leader 
Orbán criticizes the EU and has little regard for its laws (Leggewie, 2017), many Hungarians 
are in support of the organisation (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). Due to the 
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economic benefits Hungary stands to gain by remaining in the EU, the support of Hungary’s 
population increased exponentially from 44 percent in 2014 to 79 percent in 2018 (European 
Parliament, 2015; Schulmeister, et al., 2018).  
Be that as it may, Hungarians also view the EU with scepticism. More than 50 percent 
consider EU actions regarding migration challenges, terrorism and protection of outer borders 
as insufficient (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). Moreover, seven out of ten people 
want the EU to intervene more against tax fraud, unemployment, terrorism and environmental 
pollution. While no significant differences between the genders exists, the age and occupation 
of Hungarians seem decisive. Citizens between 15 and 24 years of age as well as house-persons 
are most likely to regard EU measures as sufficient (Schulmeister, Defourny & Maggio, 2018). 
Although Jobbik supports the idea of the EU as an alliance of free countries, it criticizes 
that Hungary’s membership did not fulfil previous expectations. The country, as other Eastern 
nations, joined under unequal terms due social and economic disparities. Hungary’s economy 
depends on the EU’s assistance because of the organisation’s bureaucracy. Furthermore, Jobbik 
claims that the EU is divided by various conflicts: the refugee crisis, a decreasing living 
standard in the East and security issues in the West. Europe’s leaders are considered as unable 
to solve existing problems and to establish a union of sociality, safety, Christianity and 
humanity. Hence, a radical modification is necessary to secure the EU from failing which is 
why its politicians must return to its founding goals. Jobbik advocates for a democratic EU that 
creates positive peace, acknowledges individual accountability and addresses economic issues 
(Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). 
Nevertheless, even though Jobbik negatively evaluates some EU actions and structures, 
it is not as critical as the AfD. The party supports Hungary’s membership since the country 
financially benefits from it. Due to various monetary funds, the Eastern European nation can 
diminish economic struggles and foster technological innovations. By having a positive stance 
towards the EU, Jobbik reflects the attitude of its country’s wider society which is why it can 
address its concerns and hopes in this regard. 
 
3.4 Weak economy, corruption and Jobbik’s solutions-based approach 
 
In comparison to Germany (see Chapter II), Hungary’s economic performance is weak. 
According to the Index of Economic Freedom, the Eastern European country’s economy is the 
64th freest worldwide as a result of which it ranks above global average. However, within 
Europe the country is ranked 31st. Thus, its economic freedom lies below European average. 
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Hungary’s economic growth is determined by its construction industry, exports and domestic 
demand. Although its economy is modifying towards a market-driven approach and even 
though its unemployment rate is low, it is challenged by, among other things, poverty and 
labour shortages. Moreover, the Hungarian government is increasingly becoming 
interventionist (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b). For instance, it “plans to use sectoral taxes 
to manage the budget deficit and public debt to avoid renewed European Union sanctions under 
the EU’s excessive-deficit procedure” (The Heritage Foundation, 2019b). Its judiciary is 
limited, and its independence is at risk. Moreover, the public sector is plagued by cronyism, 
the government has been accused of granting privileges to specific economic allies and state 
institutions are not willing to bring to book officials who have behaved unscrupulously (The 
Heritage Foundation, 2019b).   
As in the IEF, Hungary is ranked on the 64th position worldwide in the Corruption 
Perception Index. It is placed on the bottom of the region – only surpassed by Bulgaria and 
Greece. Although its ranking improved from 2017 until 2018, it worsened from 2012 onwards. 
Rising corruption in government represents the decline of democracy and the limited space for 
independent media and the society. Hence, not only the Central European University but also 
the Open Society Foundation were expelled out of the country. Further, basic civil rights are 
also under threat. For example, support for immigrants by civilians has been made illegal and 
foreign funded non-governmental organisations have also been restricted. Due to systematic 
violations of law, the country became subject of EU procedures which can result in the 
withdraw of the country’s voting rights (Transparency International, 2019).  
Also, within the Social Justice Index, Hungary performs below European average. It is 
placed on the 22nd position in the EU with an overall score of 5.18 points. In three of the six 
analysed categories the country is found among the last five. Hungary’s labour market, which 
experienced significant improvements during the past few years, ranks 13th in the EU. The 
overall unemployment rate is steadily decreasing. Nonetheless, the substantial increase of 
employment is mostly achieved by a rising number of citizens operating abroad. In addition, 
controversial public-work agendas were introduced which, for instance, force welfare 
recipients to do roadworks to receive financial assistance. Because educated people tend to 
leave the country, labour shortages are becoming the norm. One of the major policy issues 
Hungary is confronted with is the combat of discrimination and social inclusion. Within the 
EU, it is only ranked 25 in this category. Its government, for example, denies the integration 
of non-Christians and non-Europeans since these are considered as a threat for Hungary’s 
culture and national identity (Schraad-Tischler, et al., 2017). 
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As the findings of the indices indicate, Hungary performs worse than Germany in all 
categories. The Western European country (see Chapter II) does not only possess the EU’s 
strongest economy, it also characterized by economic freedom and a low corruption rate. 
Although, according to the SJI, some social injustices exist, Germany enjoys social cohesion 
and a lower level of discrimination compared to Hungary. Hence, economic grievances are 
more likely to occur among the Hungarian population due to the country’s weak performance 
in the abovementioned indices. 
Jobbik has made these undercurrents part of its manifesto and offers solutions to solve 
them. It intends to both repeal political immunity to end corruption and to introduce stricter 
punishments for economic offences. Due to a decrease in the number of businesses, Jobbik 
aims to establish small and medium-sized enterprises. Those can both assist people living in 
rural areas and strengthen the nation’s economy. For this case, the party plans the development 
of a State Guarantee Facility, factoring and leasing companies and a bank. Besides, it aims to 
undermine land speculation. Rather, it plans to create a legislation regarding land protection to 
realise a land ownership construct which is based on family farms. While Fidesz promotes the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) without disclosing detailed 
information about the negotiations, Jobbik views it with scepticism. The party regards TTIP as 
a threat to Hungary’s food security and economy. Moreover, it is unwilling to support an 
agreement that subverts the country’s sovereignty (Jobbik, 2019a).  
Since Hungary’s wages are among the lowest in the EU, the competitiveness of its 
economy has been on the decline. Jobbik wants Hungary to become a member of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office to end and reveal the misuse of funds (Jobbik Magyarországért 
Mozgalom, 2019). It plans to establish an independent and transparent system of tenders to 
“allow potential EU funded projects to be determined based on real and local demands rather 
than central government directives” (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019: 20). At the 
same time, the party aims to strengthen Hungary’s integration policy by fostering native talents 
and creativity as well as supporting local enterprises (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 
2019). Against this backdrop, in contrast to the AfD, Jobbik adopts a solutions-based approach 
to problems facing Hungary and advocates for a stronger coalition with EU institutions to 
improve Hungary’s economic performance. It addresses existing economic grievances which 
shows that its popularity is based on its economic approaches. Hence, Jobbik exploits 
discontents to attract supporters. 
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3.5 Xenophobia and anti-Roma attitudes 
 
As in Germany (see Chatpter II), xenophobic attitudes are on the rise in Hungary. These are, 
however, more deep-rooted, distinct and directed into various directions. Hungarians tend to 
not only directly discriminate against people of different nationalities and religions but also 
long-established minority groups like the Roma. Despite their long-standing presence, Roma 
are considered as social outsiders who follow immoral customs. Prejudices are continuously 
on the increase, making it difficult for minorities to be integrated into society (Ljujic, 2012). 
Against this backdrop, merely 36 percent of all non-Roma Hungarians think that Roma-specific 
policies for social inclusion should be established (Bíró-Nagy & Laki, 2018). Due to the 
unwillingness to integrate this minority group, many Roma suffer from unemployment, 
inadequate housing, poverty and diseases (Ljujic, 2012).  
Even though Jobbik claims to be in support of ethnic minorities living in Hungary, when 
they live in accordance with the country’s law, the party merely addresses one group in its 
manifesto: The Roma who are referred to as ‘Gypsy people’, which is a racist slur. Despite 
Jobbik’s argument that ‘Gypsies’ have to understand that they do not face restrictions and 
penalties just because they belong to that specific ethnic group, it states that development funds 
for Roma need to end since these merely benefit different activists, foundations and ‘Gypsy 
organisations’. Besides, the elimination of ‘Gypsy’ crime is indispensable no matter the means. 
Particular state-owned schools for ‘Gypsy’ children must be build that focus on adaptability 
issues and special education. Jobbik aims to establish a concept that is based on employment 
rather than social benefits because, in compliance with its perspective, ‘Gypsies’ do not need 
confirmative action but the opportunity of social integration (Jobbik, 2019a). According to 
Jobbik (2019b), its “party's programme is the only one that urges cooperation instead of 
increasing ethnic separation and divide.” This statement is insofar contradictory as the party 
insults Roma by calling them ‘Gypsy’. It directly connects the minority group with crime and 
the inability of social adaption. 
However, Hungarians do not only tend to discriminate Roma, also other minorities are 
facing discrimination: Hungary is one of the most xenophobic countries in the EU (Buring, 
2016). The negative perspectives among its population regarding foreigners is connected to the 
country’s historical background. Since the nation was isolated for many years, people fear 
marginalisation when integrating people from other regions (Buring, 2016). Almost eight out 
of ten Hungarians are afraid of immigrant related crime. Seven out of ten fear people from Iraq 
and Syria most since they are considered as a bigger threat than refugees from other states 
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(Poushter, 2016). Jobbik adapts this perspective by supporting the control of the EU’s external 
borders. According to the party’s policy stance, all member states are responsible to assist in 
establishing a sufficient border guard. This is important to protect the EU’s values and cultures. 
Since Hungary neither colonized countries of other continents nor aimed to be a cross-
continental power, it should not be forced to grant asylum. Due to the fact that most refugees 
leave their home because of the political mistakes of their former colonizers, Jobbik claims that 
Hungary is not accountable for displaced persons (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019).  
 Since its foundation, Jobbik was involved in various xenophobic scandals. The party 
does not only favour the Islam over Judaism, it also follows an antisemitic stance combined 
with Nazi rhetoric and racist statements. Jobbik creates an atmosphere of fear by stating that 
Hungary’s economy gets destroyed by Jewish bankers and that foreign Jews are buying the 
country’s land. The party accuses Israel of turning Hungary into a colony. Even within the 
parliament, Jobbik members have expressed views that are anti-Semitic. In 2014, for instance, 
Tibor Agoston called the Holocaust ‘Holoscam’ (Human Rights First, 2015). One year later, 
Lajos Rig stated that Roma are the Jews secret weapon to steal Hungary from the ‘real 
Hungarians’. Furthermore, he has a tattoo saying, ‘my honour is called loyalty’. This is insofar 
problematic as it depicts the slogan of the former National Socialist organisation Schutzstaffel. 
In Germany the use of this sentence is considered to be illegal and hate speech. Also an email 
by Gergely Kulcsár, member of the parliament for Jobbik, was published in which he boasted 
about spitting on a Holocaust memorial. Also, public statements against Roma are common. 
Tamás Sneider, Jobbik’s president since 2018, offended Orbán as a ‘Gypsy’ when he was still 
vice-president of the parliament. In this connection he also stressed the importance of radical 
groups like the extremist Betayársereg. According to him, these groups are indispensable 
because they do the work the government fails to do. Betayársereg is inculpated of organizing 
riots in Roma villages and of throwing stones on Roma people (Simon, 2015). 
 Hungarians do not only fear foreign infiltration in the form of immigrants and refugees 
but are also discriminating local minority groups like the Roma. Due to Hungary’s historical 
background, its population is a mostly homogenous group that is afraid of both the loss of its 
culture and foreign domination. As the AfD, Jobbik capitalises on these fears to achieve its 
political goals: It directly addresses the society’s discontents and offers opportunities to avoid 
heteronomy. At this juncture, it can be argued that cultural aspects are benefitting Jobbik’s 
popularity.  
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3.6 Social Media and grassroot actions as critical success factors 
 
In contrast to Germany, Hungary’s press freedom is regulated and under the thumb of 
government restrictions. According to Reporters Without Borders, the Eastern European 
country is ranked on the 87th position worldwide, 74 places underneath its Western counterpart. 
Hungary’s media landscape significantly modified under Orbán’s rule becoming increasingly 
monopolistic. The government is progressively controlling the nation’s media institutions. 
Whilst some outlets lost their editorial independence due to political harassments and 
censorship, others had to close or were bought by pro-government investors. Fidesz did not 
only establish own radio and television channels but also created news websites and 
newspapers. It almost owns all regional print media (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). Also, 
Jobbik states that Hungarian media are not only censored but under the control of the 
government; as a result, fake news and the repression of dissent have become a norm. Against 
this backdrop, the party argues that Hungary cannot be considered as a democratic state (Jobbik 
Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019).   
Since Hungary’s traditional media are regarded as Fidesz’s mouthpiece (Karl, 2017a), 
Jobbik uses Social Media to spread its perspectives and news. As the AfD, the party owns 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube accounts and cooperates with different online 
networks. Its usage is more interactive rather than hierarchical. Jobbik constantly 
communicates with its followers and motivates them to share publications. Thereby, it directly 
approaches digital natives which provide explanation for its success among young voters (Karl, 
2017b). Furthermore, Jobbik focuses on grassroot politics next to its online presence. It, for 
example, cooperates with various nationalist rock bands like Kárpátia to attract young people 
(Petsinis, 2016). By organizing an annual Mayfest since 2007, the party accomplished to build 
a symbiosis between Hungary’s identitary music bands and the right-wing nationalist 
subculture. The Mayfests are an important event for the right-wing extremist scene. They 
combine political speeches with various leisure activities. Jobbik’s involvement increased its 
popularity because it assists in attracting both moderate pagan-nationalist and authoritarian-
racist groups. Besides, the party also arranges periodic festivals and commemorations, and 
publicly patrols Hungary’s border fence (Karl, 2017a). Jobbik arranges youth camps and 
forums. It organises community events, prints leaflets and represents itself at university 
festivals (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Thus, it “has made substantial investments to rejuvenate the 
Hungarian far right, not only at the ideological […] but also at the organisational level” (Pirro 
& Róna, 2018: 10).  
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Moreover, Jobbik adopted a new communication and sales strategy in 2013. The so 
called ‘cuteness-campaign’ aims to change the party’s image from one of the EU’s most 
extreme parties to a mainstream party (Györi, 2017). Since Jobbik was considered as 
unacceptable for many Hungarians, its chances to govern the country were slim, requiring the 
adoption of a more moderate stance became indispensable (Györi, 2016). For instance, it 
distanced itself from its previous support of the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) which 
aimed to police Roma (Kim, 2016). Although the guard was forbidden by law in 2009 
(Langebach & Speit, 2013), it sustainably impacted Jobbik’s media presence (Varga, 2014). 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that Jobbik only changed its communication strategy, not its 
ideals (Györi, 2016).  
Despite various media restrictions that impede Jobbik’s publicity, it can successfully 
sell its policies with the aid of Social Media and grassroot actions. It directly addresses its 
supporters and communicates with them on an interactive level. Thus, its popularity is fostered 
by both its target-driven media usage and organisation of public events. 
 
3.7 Jobbik’s electoral success 
 
As in Germany (see Chapter II), national elections take place every four years in Hungary. 
Hence, since its foundation, Jobbik took part in four elections. Its electoral performances are 
indicated and compared with those of the ruling party Fidesz in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: National election results Jobbik and Fidesz (International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems, 2019; Norsk senter for forskningsdata, 2019) 
 
As Figure 3 illustrates, Jobbik was able to significantly improve its electoral performance since 
its first elections in 2006, where it only received 2.2 percent. Due to a 5 percent threshold, the 
party was not able to enter the parliament before 2010. Here, it won 16.67 percent of all votes, 
more than seven times as many as in 2006 (Norsk senter for forskningsdata, 2019). Four years 
later it managed to increase its popularity by 3.79 percent. However, while the party received 
20.2 percent of all votes in 2014, it was merely supported by 19.1 percent in 2018. 
Nevertheless, despite the slight decrease in electoral support, Jobbik became Hungary’s second 
strongest party. While it was outvoted by Fidesz and the Hungarian Socialist Party in 2014 
and 2010, merely Fidesz received more support in 2018. Thus, although Jobbik lost 1.1 percent 
of votes, it gained national popularity to become Hungary’s main opposition party 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2019). 
 As Jobbik, Fidesz was able to significantly increase its support from 2006 to 2010 when 
it became Hungary’s ruling party. Nevertheless, although its electoral outcomes are constantly 
higher than the ones of Jobbik, its popularity decreased after 2010. Despite a slight increase in 
the 2018 elections, it was not able to repeat or surpass the electoral success of 2010. Thus, as 
Figure 3 indicates, whilst Fidesz’s success decreased in 2014, Jobbik’s augmented. In 2018, 
however, the opposite happened when Fidesz’s share of elections saw an increase while 
Jobbik’s declined. This is insofar suspicious since the refugee crisis took place between the 
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national elections of 2014 and 2018. Thus, this indicates that the ruling party addressed cultural 
grievances resulting from the refugee crisis in a more consistent way. In contrast to that, the 
financial crisis of 2008 bolstered the prominence of both parties since their popularity improved 
thereafter. Hence, while Fidesz was able to sustainably utilize both the refugee and financial 
crises in its favour, Jobbik merely benefitted from the latter in the long-term. 
Nevertheless, Jobbik is not popular at national levels alone but also at a European level. 
In 2009, when the party took place at the EPE for the first time, it received 14.77 percent of all 
votes. Hence, it became Hungary’s second strongest party after Fidesz. It was able to sustain 
its success in 2014. With 14.67 percent, its performance remained stable (European Parliament, 
2019b). However, despite Jobbik’s strong performance in all previous elections, the results of 
the 2019 EPE illustrate a significant backward trend: The party only received 6.41 percent of 
all votes. Hence, while it became Hungary’s second strongest party in 2018, it was outvoted 
by four parties during the European Parliamentary Elections in 2019; namely, Fidesz, the DC, 
Momentum and a coalition of the MSZP and the Dialogue for Hungary (European Parliament, 
2019c).  
To comprehend Jobbik’s popularity its continuous performance needs to be examined. 
Due to data unavailability, the analysis of Jobbik’s forecasts begins in 2010. As in Chapter II, 
it ends in 2018. The findings are summarized in Figure 3: 
 
 
Figure 4: Electoral forecasts Jobbik (Közvéleménykutatók.hu, 2019) 
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As the diagram demonstrates, Jobbik’s electoral forecasts are characterized by various 
fluctuations. In contrast to the AfD’s (see Chapter II), no positive trend is visible. While the 
party increased its popularity between 2010 and 2012, it decreased in 2013. Despite a rise in 
2014 and 2015, it began to steadily diminish since 2016. In 2018, merely 15.6 percent of 
Hungary’s population supported the party, 9 percent less than in 2015 when it reached its peak. 
Although Figure 4 indicates that the 2008 financial crisis and Jobbik’s modified 
communication strategy increased its popularity in 2013, it is clear that its support began to 
decrease after the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015. Thus, Jobbik either did not pay enough 
attention to the handling of displaced persons, did not make its radical stances clear enough or 
it simply could not be differentiated from those of other parties. Without a doubt, the party did 
not exploit the immigration crisis as effectively as the AfD (Közvéleménykutatók.hu, 2019). 
A clear backward trend is visible which shows Jobbik’s weak performance in the 2019 EPE. 
To comprehend whether Jobbik’s electoral performance is related to cultural 
discontents stemming from the number of people moving to Hungary, Figure 4 illustrates the 
rate of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers entering the country between 2010 and 2018. 
Data for previous years are not available. 
 
 
Figure 5: Immigration into Hungary: Number of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants from 
2010 until 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019) 
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As Figure 5 demonstrates, the number of immigrants moving to Hungary remained relatively 
stable from 2010 to 2016. From 2017 onwards, however, it began to increase. As in Germany 
(see Chapter II), estimates do not indicate whether the immigrants are permanently or 
temporarily moving to the Eastern European nation. Moreover, they do not demonstrate the 
proportion of EU-nationals and non-EU-nationals (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2019). 
It is clear that the number of immigrants increased at the same time the amount of asylum 
seekers decreased. Figure 5 indicates a sharp rise of applications for asylum in 2014, reaching 
its peak in 2015. In comparison to immigrants, asylum seekers merely include people who are 
not originating from EU member states (European Parliament, 2019). 
 Similarly, the number of refugees that are recognized by Hungary is consistently below 
the number of both asylum seekers and immigrants. Hence, although the Eastern European 
nation has external EU-borders and is because of this one of the first European countries 
refugees can reach, only a small percentage of them decides to stay. Furthermore, it is 
noticeable that neither significant decreases nor increases took place during the analysed 
timeframe. Rather, the number of displaced persons entering Hungary remained stable between 
2010 and 2018 (European Parliament, 2019a). 
 As Figure 4 indicates, Jobbik was most popular in 2015, the year Hungary received 
most applications of asylum. Thus, it can be assumed that the party was able to directly address 
grievances resulting from the number of asylum seekers. Nonetheless, due to its decrease in 
popularity thereafter, Jobbik was unable to utilize the consequences of the crisis long-term 
political appeal. Furthermore, its increased support since 2010 indicates that the party 
sustainably approached economic concerns resulting from the financial crisis of 2008. Whilst 
economic uncertainties and financial insecurity are the biggest fears of Jobbik voters (Boros & 
Laki, 2018), two out of ten also regard foreign religions (and their cultures) threatening to 
Hungary’s national identity (Boros, 2017). An increasing rate of foreigners can not only lead 
to the decline of traditional merits but can also result in increased competition for economic 
resources and job opportunities between immigrants and the locals. Nevertheless, even though 
more people decided to migrate to Hungary from 2017 onwards, Jobbik’s popularity has 
declined. Thus, it can be assumed that the party does not address grievances resulting from 
general immigration. Instead, based on its policy statements, it mainly focuses on existing 
economic grievances resulting from the failures of previous governments and cultural concerns 
stemming from local minority groups. 
Jobbik’s support base differs from the one of the AfD (see Chapter II). While RWP is 
a new political phenomenon in Germany, it has long been a part of Hungary’s modern politics. 
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In comparison to the AfD, Jobbik is most favoured by young voters. Against this backdrop, the 
age is decisive for its popularity. In 2017, 23 percent of all Hungarians aged 30 or younger 
supported the party (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Jobbik attracts teenagers of all social backgrounds 
who aim to figure out their place in Hungary’s political landscape and society at-large. They 
are mostly male and not part of other organisations (Pirro & Róna, 2018). Among all voters, 
especially internet users of the younger generation are overrepresented (Kim, 2016). Besides, 
electoral support for the party transcends classes with both the elite and the working class 
voting for it during elections. It is only in Budapest that the intellectual elite is underrepresented 
(Boros, 2016). Furthermore, Jobbik receives support from Hungary’s middle class across the 
country although it is most successful in the peripheries (Mares & Havlík, 2016). While almost 
every third Hungarian (28 percent) considers Jobbik as trustworthy ruling party, 53 percent are 
not so convinced, especially people older than 60 years of age (Boros & Laki, 2018). 
 
3.8 Concluding remarks: The importance of economic and cultural aspects 
 
Jobbik is part of Hungary’s parliament since 2010. Its success is based on both Hungary’s 
social fabric and structural conditions which are in favour of RWP. Even though the country is 
ruled by the RWPP Fidesz since 2010, Jobbik was able to constantly increase its electoral 
success which is why it became Hungary’s second strongest and therewith main opposition 
party in 2018. Despite a backward trend regarding its share of votes, it can attract a wide 
support base. With the aid of Social Media and grassroot actions, it successfully addresses its 
target group. In comparison to the AfD (see Chapter II), Jobbik’s support base consists of the 
younger generation and many first-time voters. As the majority of Hungarians, the party is in 
favour of the EU. Nevertheless, Hungary is not only characterized by a weak and corrupted 
economy but also by social injustices. At this juncture, Jobbik is able to exploit economic 
grievances. It addresses existing discontents and offers potential solutions to diminish these.  
Next to that, the country’s population is regarded as more xenophobic than Germany’s. 
Not only are immigrants and refugees unwelcome, also local minority groups like Roma and 
Jews are facing discrimination. Due to Hungary’s isolated history, its people are afraid of 
foreign domination and the loss of cultures which is why its people aim to protect traditional 
values and customs. Jobbik directly approaches cultural grievances in its manifesto and 
provides potential implementations which intend to solve existing challenges. Thus, the party 
does not only exploit the Hungarian society’s economic grievances but also its cultural 
frustrations. Addressing wide-spread fears accounts for Jobbik’s success. Nevertheless, it is 
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clear that the party’s election forecast results declined after the peak of the refugee crisis in 
2015 since it gave Jobbik the chance to further spread xenophobic views to attract supporters 
in the long-term. 
As the AfD’s, Jobbik’s stances and utterances are fraught by contradictions: While 
Jobbik describes Hungary as welcoming and multicultural state, it does not want to grant 
asylum to refugees. Moreover, even though it claims that minorities within Hungary must be 
protected, it discriminates Roma at the same time. The party does not only utilize the name 
‘Gypsy’, an offensive and racist slur, when talking about Roma but also incriminates them of 
various issues. No other minorities are affronted in its manifesto although some of Jobbik’s 
politicians showed contemptuous attitudes towards, for instance, Jews in the past.  
51 
Chapter IV 
 
Analysis and interpretation of findings: Underlying reasons for the AfD and Jobbik’s 
success 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To make sense of the reasons that have propelled the rise of RWP in Germany and Hungary, 
and to investigate the existential features the AfD and Jobbik have in common, it is essential 
to compare the structural make-ups of the two societies. Furthermore, it is important to examine 
the political appearances and agendas of the selected parties in relation to the given social 
conditions and political configurations. Against this background, it is the aim of this chapter to 
identify the causes for the AfD and Jobbik’s increasing success. It intends to answer the 
following questions: How do the structural conditions of Germany differ from those of 
Hungary? To what extent do the AfD and Jobbik resemble each other in relation to their 
ideologies and electoral success? Do economic or cultural considerations provide definite 
explanations for the rise of RWP in Germany and Hungary? 
 Since this thesis argues that cultural aspects are decisive for the AfD’s success while 
both economic and cultural factors determine Jobbik’s popularity, this chapter compares 
existing social and political grievances underlying the two countries. First, the impacts of 
economic grievances will be analysed before Germany and Hungary’s cultural challenges are 
examined. Second, the policy statements of the two RWPPs are compared and put into 
analytical perspective. Lastly, the AfD and Jobbik’s communication strategies and electoral 
performances are put into comparative perspective. 
   
4.2 The impact of economic grievances 
 
The rise of RWP in democracies has been perceived to be a symptom of pre-existing social 
grievances (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). Hence, economic deprivations can provide fertile 
ground for right-wing populist attitudes. As investigated in Chapter II and Chapter III, 
economic discontents exist in both Germany and Hungary. However, whilst Germany is 
regarded as the EU’s strongest economy, Hungary is characterized by a weak economic 
performance and a lack of economic freedom. Its judiciary is not only threatened to lose its 
independence due to government meddling, its economy is also challenged by labour shortages 
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and a litany of social challenges. Hungary’s struggles regarding economic discrimination and 
social exclusion are unique despite the fact that Germany also faces challenges relating to 
economic injustices, its society benefits from a strong labour market.  
 Against this backdrop, merely Jobbik’s policy preoccupations centre around economic 
factors. The Hungarian party exploits economic grievances by making the ruling government 
responsible for economic injustices and by emphasizing its ability to improve Hungary’s 
economic performance. It offers various concepts that aim to alter the country’s economic 
system and to create employment. Jobbik, for example, intends to create small and medium 
sized enterprises in rural areas. Although the AfD also addresses economic aspects in its policy 
statements through its advocacy for a minimum wage, it has scant interest in addressing the 
social injustices bedevilling Germany. As a result, it is not surprising that economic discontents 
receive attention only when they are linked to immigration. Hence, as a solution for rising 
labour shortages in Germany, the AfD advocates increasing fertility for the intake of 
immigrants. Although it is plausible that the party does not base its policies on economic 
grievances due to Germany’s strong economy, it prevents the AfD from sustainably attracting 
supporters who harbour economic discontents. Even though the country performs well 
economically, economic frustrations do exist due to employment and education injustices. 
From this it follows that economic aspects are not decisive for the AfD’s success since its 
electoral performance has been on upward trajectory despite not exploiting people’s economic 
frustrations. In essence, whilst economic grievances are behind Jobbik’s popularity, the AfD’s 
electoral appeal has been enhanced by the party’s exploitation of cultural grievances among 
Germans.   
 
4.3 Cultural challenges and prejudices  
 
As shown in Chapter II and Chapter III, cultural grievances impact the rise of RWP in Germany 
and Hungary. Both the AfD and Jobbik address public frustrations which result from concerns 
relating to immigration. Whilst the AfD merely criticises Muslims in its policy statements, 
Jobbik mainly focuses on Roma, one of Europe’s largest minority groups. Hence, in contrast 
to the AfD, Jobbik does not base its antipathy towards a religious group but against ethnicity. 
Nevertheless, even though this makes it seem like Muslims are most unfavoured in Germany 
and Roma in Hungary, a study by the Pew Research Center (2016) discovered the opposite:  
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Table 1: Negative attitudes towards Muslims, Roma and Jews  
 Muslims Roma Jews 
Germany  29% 40% 5% 
Hungary 72% 64% 32% 
EU average 43% 48% 16% 
Source: Pew Research Center (2016) 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants are more common in 
Hungary than in Germany. In comparison to the EU average, the antipathy of Germany’s 
society to minority groups is less whereas it is bigger in Hungary. It is clear that Roma are 
regarded as more unfavourable than Muslims in Germany since political debates and the AfD’s 
policy statement mainly focus on the Islam. However, it reflects the EU average which also 
regards Roma as persona non gratae. Moreover, it is noticeable that Muslims are more 
unwelcome than Roma among the Hungarian population which is reflected in Jobbik not taking 
aim at the Islam in its manifestos. This finding may result from the fact that 76 percent of 
Hungary’s population claim that Muslims aim to be distinct. Only 16 percent think that they 
are willing to adapt to national customs. In Germany, on the other hand, every third person 
regards Muslims as ready to integrate (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
citizens of both countries share similar sentiments about Jews. Even though six times more 
Hungarians view them with scepticism, Jews are overall the most welcome minority group 
(Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016).      
 The fact that the AfD mainly focuses on Muslims and Jobbik on Roma might also be 
related to the refugee crisis. Whilst Figure 6 illustrates the number of refugees seeking hostage 
in Germany and Hungary, Figure 7 indicates the amount of asylum applications in the selected 
countries between 2013 and 2018. The statistics begin in 2013 since this is the year the AfD 
was founded. Statistics regarding general immigration are not illustrated since, as investigated 
in Chapter II and Chapter III, the number refugees and asylum seekers are decisive for the AfD 
and Jobbik’s success. 
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Figure 6: Number of refugees entering Germany and Hungary (European Parliament, 2019a) 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of asylum applications in Germany and Hungary (European Parliament, 
2019a) 
 
As Figure 6 illustrates, significantly more refugees entered Germany between 2013 and 2018. 
Besides, while the rate of refugees coming to Germany is consistently increasing, it remains 
relatively stable in Hungary. This corresponds with the patterns in Figure 7 which demonstrates 
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that more people applied for asylum in the Western European country. Whilst Germany 
received more applications for asylum than any other EU member state in 2016 when it reached 
its summit, the quantity of applications in Hungary already peaked in 2015. Hence, the number 
of displaced persons who aimed to immigrate into Hungary decreased after 2015, one year 
earlier than in Germany.  
Nevertheless, although less displaced persons enter and apply for asylum in Hungary, 
Hungarians view refugees with more scepticism than Germans. While six out of ten Germans 
are concerned about the rise of immigrant-related crimes, almost eight out of ten Hungarians 
share similar fears. Thus, most citizens fear that the risk of domestic terrorism increases with a 
growing number of refugees. Only a minority of the population in both countries claims that 
cultural diversity and immigration reduce the living standard of the indigenes, i.e. 31 percent 
in Germany and 41 percent in Hungary (Poushter, 2016). 
 As the foregoing, xenophobic attitudes towards Muslim, Roma and Jews still exist in 
both countries. Islamophobic attitudes increased during the refugee crisis. Whilst the AfD 
directly addressed this phenomenon in its policies, Jobbik did not. Rather, the focus was kept 
on Roma even though the Hungarian population demonstrated an aversion towards Islam. This 
might explain why the AfD increased its share of votes during the refugee crisis whereas Jobbik 
suffered reduction in electoral support. In this regard, the AfD was more successful than its 
Eastern counterpart in addressing cultural grievances resulting from the growing number of 
refugees. However, this does not indicate that cultural grievances do not play a role for the 
success of Hungary’s Jobbik. Instead it indicates that the right-wing party did not adequately 
deal with the question of Muslim refugees. As per the above-mentioned survey, more 
Hungarians than Germans hold prejudices against foreigners. Hence, cultural aspects continue 
to shape the public discourse and political decision-making in Germany and Hungary. They 
have the potential to increase the popularity and success of RWPPs in both countries.   
 
4.4 Policy statements to approach discontents 
 
It is indispensable to individually analyse and compare the policy statements of the AfD and 
Jobbik to comprehend their success since they shed light into the parties’ aims, ideological 
underpinnings and principles. They depict how they view themselves, what their official 
objectives are and which grievances the RWPPs give most attention to. Furthermore, they 
illustrate on which aspects the parties base their popularity. As the previous chapters depict, 
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various commonalities and differences between the manifestos of the AfD and Jobbik exist. 
Although some assertions appear similar, they exhibit differing ideological underpinnings.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of the political agendas  
AfD Jobbik 
Differences 
Opposes Germany’s membership of the EU Pro-EU 
Anti-Islam Anti-Roma 
Espouses anti-refugee sentiments due to 
security, economic and cultural 
considerations 
Opposes granting asylum to displaced persons 
due to historical and cultural considerations 
Prioritises a national and European frontier 
defence 
Calls for efficient border control of the EU’s 
external borders 
In denial of the climate change  Acknowledgment of the climate change 
Supportive of Germany strengthening 
relations with Russia  
Supports strengthening Hungary’s 
relationship with Germany, Turkey and 
Russia 
Promotes fertility as an antidote to labour 
shortages 
Supports creation of attractive economic for 
retention of scarce skills 
Pro-media regulation and surveillance Pro-media freedom 
Hyper critical of government and less 
solutions oriented  
Provides solutions to Hungary’s cultural and 
economic grievances 
Commonalities 
Excessive and radical political messages 
Regard themselves as custodians of national interests 
Place disproportionate importance on protection of national sovereignty 
Emphasis on the preservation of native cultures and traditions 
Sources: Alternative für Deutschland (2016); Jobbik (2019a); Jobbik (2019b) 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, the policies of the AfD and Jobbik share more discrepancies than 
they do commonalities. While the AfD views the EU with scepticism by stating that it would 
facilitate Germany’s exit from it if the institution does not make significant policy changes, 
Jobbik holds more positive sentiments towards the regional organisation. It supports Hungary’s 
57 
membership because the country depends on it. Since the majority of both populations 
acknowledge their nation’s membership in the EU, Jobbik’s perspective corresponds to the 
attitude of the Hungarian society.  
Next to that, the parties’ antipathy towards minority groups differ. The AfD clearly 
states that the Islam does not belong to Germany and that most Muslims are unwilling to 
integrate (Alternative für Deuschland, 2016). Jobbik, on the contrary, criticizes Roma rather 
than any religious group. Despite its intention to support minorities, it openly declares its 
aversion against the tribe. This finding is suspicious since most Germans are more antipathetic 
towards Roma and Hungarians towards Muslims.  
Although both RWPPs regard immigration as problematic, their stances differ. 
According to the AfD, refugees, particularly Muslims, portray a national security risk and a 
danger for traditional values. Furthermore, they are less educated than natives and not eligible 
for the labour market. Most of them want to live on the cost of the government. Jobbik, on the 
other hand, refuses to grant asylum for displaced persons due to cultural reasons and because 
Hungary never colonized other countries. Although the parties agree that the external borders 
of the EU need to be controlled. While this seems to be sufficient for Jobbik since Hungary 
possesses external borders, the AfD considers it as inadequate measure.  Because Germany is 
a popular destination for refugees, the party regards the additional protection of its national 
borders as indispensable.  
Another significant difference is that only Jobbik admits the existence of the climate 
change (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, 2019). Even though both parties consider the 
protection of the environment as important, the AfD does not believe that the climate change 
is a man-made phenomenon. Its denialism led to its outvoting by the Greens in the 2019 EPE. 
Besides, the foreign policies of the RWPPs differ in their intensity. Whilst the AfD openly 
declares its support for Russia, Jobbik aims to intensify its relations to Russia, Germany and 
Turkey. To fill labour shortages which exist in both countries, the AfD plans to increase the 
birth rate of Germans by promising financial compensation. Jobbik, on the other hand, intends 
to make Hungary more attractive for locals to avoid a brain-drain. Therefore, the party states 
concrete plans with the express purpose to diminish economic grievances.  
The biggest difference between the two parties is, however, their capability to offer 
solutions to the problems they identify. The AfD’s political statement is characterized by a lot 
of criticism that exposes the alleged failings of established parties. Ideas to solve 
abovementioned issues are rare and generalized, and economic grievances in particular are 
hardly addressed. Although Jobbik attacks mainstream parties as well, it directly approaches 
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deprivations by offering possible ways to solve them. It, for instance, plans to establish 
enterprises that aim to support people living in rural areas (Jobbik, 2019a). Hence, in contrast 
to the AfD, Jobbik addresses public grievances by not only identifying them but also by 
suggesting potential solutions for their elimination.  
Nonetheless, the two parties also agree on some points. They do not only make use of 
excessively radical utterances that seem to mirror the concerns of the population but also share 
their right-wing populist stances. Both parties clearly differentiate between the ruling elite and 
the people, foster national sovereignty, criticise corruption and aim to strengthen local customs, 
cultures and values. Thus, they aim to represent their respective population by addressing 
public grievances and by making the government responsible for existing discontents. 
 From this it follows that the AfD approaches existing challenges in a different manner 
than Jobbik. It does not only neglect the truth about the climate change being man-made but 
also puts less emphasis on existing economic concerns. Instead its policy statement is 
characterized by being critical towards established parties and foreigners. The party portrays 
itself as superior and emphasizes the special features of being German. Cultural aspects clearly 
dominate its agenda. In contrast to that, Jobbik addresses both cultural and economic 
discontents to a similar extent. Thus, its policies focus on various grievances and possible ways 
to solve them. Moreover, as the AfD, it criticises mainstream parties and immigrants. Against 
this backdrop, while the two parties clearly have different economic policy positions, they share 
similar stances regarding cultural sentiments. 
 
4.5 Communication strategy, Social Media and electoral success 
 
Without media, the AfD and Jobbik would be unable to sell their policies on a wide scale. 
Against this backdrop, communication is decisive for their popularity and therewith success. 
Figure 8 compares all elections results of the two parties between 2013 and 2019. Whilst N1 
stands for national elections 1, N2 accounts for national elections 2. Thus, in the case of 
Germany the N1 took place in 2013 and the N2 in 2017. In Hungary, N1 represents 2014 and 
N2 2018.  
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Figure 8: Compared electoral success between 2013 and 2019 
 
As Figure 8 illustrates, the electoral success of the two RWPPs has been different since 2013. 
While the AfD was able to augment its share of votes from 2013 until 2017, with a sharp 
increase in 2017, its support declined thereafter. In the 2019 EPE, it received 1.63 percent less 
than in the previous elections. Thus, the AfD had its best results in 2017 when it became 
Germany’s third strongest and at the same time main opposition party. The course of the AfD’s 
graph and the high ascent from 2014 to 2017 indicates that the refugee crisis played a 
significant role in the AfD’s popularity. After Germany received more applications for asylum 
than any other EU member state in 2016, the party successfully addressed cultural grievances 
and was able to almost double its share of votes.  
Jobbik, on the other hand, lost on popularity since the national elections in 2014. 
Although these took place in the same year as the 2014 EPE, it reived 5.53 percent more on a 
national level despite its positive stance towards the EU. Four years later, Jobbik increased its 
share of votes again. Even though it was not able to repeat its success from N1, it became 
Hungary’s second strongest and therewith main opposition party with 19.1 percent. Hence, the 
refugee crisis did not sustainably increase Jobbik’s popularity. Instead its support diminished 
compared to the national elections in 2014. From this it follows that the party was not able to 
successfully address cultural grievances resulting from the immigration crisis in the long-term. 
It did in the short-term as its election forecasts (see Chapter III) demonstrate. Jobbik’s 
downward trend continued in the 2019 European Parliamentary Elections in which it received 
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its worst results in the observed timeframe and less percent than the AfD. Jobbik is constantly 
performing better on a national than on an international level.  
In summary, Jobbik was more successful than its German counterpart in three out of 
four analysed elections. The AfD merely outvoted Jobbik in the 2019 EPE. While an overall 
positive trend is detectable for the AfD, despite the weak performance on a European level in 
2019, Jobbik’s trajectory is more negative since its results worsened since 2015.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Not only do the policy statements of the AfD and Jobbik differ, the structural conditions and 
social reverberations of Germany and Hungary are also divergent. Thus, although RWP gained 
in popularity in the two countries since 1989, its causes are different. Whilst Germany 
developed into Europe’s economic powerhouse since its reunification, Hungary is struggling 
under a weak economy which is further weakened by high levels of corruption. The Western 
European country performs better in all analysed indices: the IEF, CPI and SJI. Even though it 
is challenged by social injustices, less economic discontents than in Hungary exist. This is 
reflected in the AfD and Jobbik’s manifestos. While the AfD hardly focuses on economic 
development, Jobbik does not only state various grievances but also offers potential solutions 
to strengthen Hungary’s economy. From this it follows that economic challenges are more 
decisive for the rise of RWP in Hungary than in Germany.  
Nonetheless, cultural aspects are playing a major role in both selected countries. Despite 
different emphases regarding unfavoured minorities and divergent public opinions, the AfD 
and Jobbik criticise foreign infiltration. The two parties clearly place emphasis on the 
importance of maintaining national identities and traditions. Although xenophobic attitudes are 
more widespread in Hungary, the AfD successfully addresses cultural concerns among the 
German population. In contrast to Jobbik, it utilized the refugee crisis for its benefit and 
significantly improved its electoral performance as a result. This was eased by the fact that 
Germany received more applications for asylum in 2016 than any other EU member state. 
Moreover, more refugees entered the nation than Hungary between 2013 and 2018. Hence, 
cultural aspects have become the major determinant factor behind the rise of RWP in both 
countries. The two parties disproportionately focus on cultural challenges confronting their 
respective society with policy utterances that promote flagrant discrimination against refugees 
and other minority groups.  
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Chapter V 
 
Conclusion: Economic and cultural discontents and the rise of right-wing populism in 
Germany and Hungary 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Unearthing the circumstances behind European RWP and whether cultural or economic aspects 
foster it is indispensable to understand the AfD and Jobbik’s success. Having said this, it was 
the aim of this thesis to decipher the causes of the rise of RWP in the EU, Germany and 
Hungary in particular, against the backdrop of the rise of right-wing populist parties in the 
European Union. With the aid of the comparative case study approach, it intended to investigate 
the reasons for the increasing popularity of the AfD of Germany and Jobbik of Hungary, the 
main opposition parties in the two countries’ parliaments. Although Germany and Hungary 
have different historical and political backgrounds, both EU member states have been 
confronted with an increase of right-wing populist attitudes. As a result, the study analysed and 
contrasted the social, cultural and economic conditions of the two nations. It did not only focus 
on Germany and Hungary’s social and political landscapes and the cultural and economic 
cleavages in these two societies, but also on their cultural and economic discontents. It also 
examined the two parties’ electoral performance against the backdrop of media usage. To 
analyse their communication strategies is crucial because media have the power to directly 
impact public discourse and opinion building. All structural conditions were analysed in 
relation to the parties’ policy statements in order to paint a full picture of the popularity of 
RWP.  
This thesis argued that cultural aspects are decisive for the success of the AfD and 
Jobbik. Furthermore, also economic discontents fuelled by soaring levels of immigration have 
played an important factor behind the rise of RWPPs mainly in Hungary while playing a 
marginal role in Germany. While xenophobia has influence on the voting behaviour in both 
Germany and Hungary, it is only in the case of the latter that economic grievances have had a 
significant impact. Unlike Germany, EU’s strongest economy, Hungary struggles under a weak 
economic performance, which has been made worse by the high levels of corruption plaguing 
the country. Hence, economic discontents seem only to have a bearing on the electoral success 
of Jobbik, while cultural grievances have influenced the success of both Jobbik and AfD during 
elections.  
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 The aim of this chapter is it to examine the scope of impact of the Cultural Backlash 
Thesis and the Economic Insecurity Perspective and to discuss the research findings. First, 
theoretical reflections will be analysed on a macrolevel to investigate the extent the two 
theories account for RWP in both Hungary and Germany against other experiences elsewhere 
in the EU. Hence, the section identifies whether one theory is supreme in the EU and if one has 
a deeper theoretical basis. Second, this chapter focuses on the theoretical implications at a 
microlevel. It examines the extent the CBT and EIP account for the rising popularity of the 
AfD and Jobbik. Similarities as well as differences between Germany and Hungary will be paid 
more attention. Subsequently, suggestions for further research are provided at the end. 
 
5.2 Theoretical reflections and the rise of right-wing populism in the European Union 
 
In the past few years Europe has faced increasing levels of RWPPs making RWP one of the 
EU’s biggest challenges of the modern age. RWP has come not only to threaten liberal 
democracies in the EU member states, it has also come to threaten the Union as an institution. 
For instance, the RWPP Lega is part of the government in Italy, the Sweden Democrats (SD) 
received record results in the 2018 national elections in Sweden (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018). 
At the same time, authoritarian demagogues are becoming increasingly popular in Eastern 
Europe. In Poland, for example, the ruling party Law and Justice (PiS) promotes conservative 
and totalitarian policies. Also, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia nationalistic parties are in 
power (Bax, 2018).  
The rise of right-wing populism in Europe is reflected in the performance of right-wing 
populist parties during the European Parliamentary Elections. Since the European 
Parliamentary Elections of 2014, which saw the political undercurrents in Europe making 
significant shifts to the right, the EU has been under crisis mode that has continued to shake up 
the foundations of the organisation (Hetzer, 2015). It was manifested in the 2019 European 
Parliamentary Elections when EU-critical right-wing parties were able to outvote mainstream 
parties in countries like France and Great Britain (Axel Springer SE, 2019b). In accordance 
with the CBT and EIP, deep seated cultural and economic cleavages have been significant for 
the rising popularity of RWPPs across the EU. However, due to the member states’ divergent 
structural conditions and the varying impacts of economic and cultural cleavages in each 
society, no single approach provides a sweeping account for the rise of RWP.  
 Driving the wave of populism in the EU is the fear of refugees who have been blamed 
for the socioeconomic and sociocultural challenges the region is grappling with (Wolf, 2017). 
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Estimates show that the people who vote for RWPPs (76 percent in France for Front National 
(FN), 69 percent in Austria for the FPA, 66 percent in Italy for Lega, 58 percent in Poland for 
PiS and 57 percent in the Netherlands for the Party for Freedom (PVV) have an aversion for 
globalisation as it spawns cultural and social changes that fly in the ways of traditional ways 
of society (Hartleb, 2017). The fear of the unknown and the fear of not being able to handle 
challenging situations impact Europe’s electorate (Wolf, 2017). The rise of RWP identifies that 
these social changes are perceived as too fast by many citizens (Hartleb, 2017). 
As shown elsewhere in the paper, the 2015 refugee crisis, which was precipitated by 
swathes of immigrants mainly from the Middle East and North Africa, had a direct effect on 
proliferation and dominance of RWPP in the EU. This conforms with the Cultural Backlash 
Thesis which states that the support of RWP is a social-psychological phenomenon that is 
fostered by modifying social conditions and value changes. Due to increasing migrant 
movements and the rising global interconnectedness, Europeans are concerned about the 
potential devastating effect of immigration on their cultures and national identities. RWPPs 
have exploited these dissatisfactions in society for their own narrow ends, relying on 
nationalistic messages that evoke nostalgic sentiments about Europe’s ‘illustrious’ political and 
cultural history as well as the preservation of the sovereignty of EU member states. 
Nevertheless, cultural grievances are mostly combined with socio-economic anxieties that 
result from perceived economic disadvantages currently perpetuated by foreign infiltration. 
Thus, globalisation does not only endanger traditional norms, it is also considered to threaten 
the economic security of the EU’s member states. As the refugee crisis spawned cultural 
grievances, the global financial crisis of 2008, which resulted in the Euro Crisis, also increased 
economic concerns. Consequently, political instability developed due to economic and social 
inequalities both between and within the EU member states. The rise of right-wing populist 
attitudes resulting from economic insecurity conforms with the Economic Insecurity 
Perspective which states that the increasing popularity of RWP is correlated to economic 
downturns. Because social inequality can have a direct effect on the maturity of democracy, 
the rise of RWPPs can be proportioned to growing economic difficulties plaguing a nation. 
From this it follows that economic deprivation and social disparity determine the strength and 
longevity of RWP.  
 However, generalizations regarding whether the CBT and EIP are concomitant for the 
rise of RWP in the EU cannot be made. The organisation’s member states do not only differ in 
terms of historical backgrounds, but also in relation to their economic performances and social 
nomenclatures. Furthermore, cultural diversity has a regional dimension as it is understood 
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differently in Eastern compared to Western Europe. Whilst cultural diversity is embraced as 
having an enriching effect on human coexistence in the latter, many Eastern European countries 
consider it as existential threat to their national identities and labour market. Thus, findings 
from the East cannot be applied blanketly to the West. Since the EU member states differ 
regarding their structural conditions, right-wing populist parties have been propelled by 
different social and political circumstances. Besides, the CBT must be viewed in relation to the 
EIP since both theories directly impact each other. Social division can deteriorate as a result of 
economic decline which can exacerbate tensions in society. The finance and refugee crises 
expedited the economic and social destabilisation of the European society. Against this 
backdrop, the extent to which the CBT and EIP account for the rise of RWP must be analysed 
within the individual contexts of the EU member states.   
  
5.3 Theoretical implications regarding the increasing success of the German Alternative 
für Deutschland and the Hungarian Jobbik 
 
Despite their EU membership and geographic location, Germany and Hungary exhibit stark 
differences in the realm of politics as well as in economic and sociocultural spheres. Whilst 
Hungary’s society remained homogenous for most of its history, Germany is characterized by 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, while RWP is a deep-rooted phenomenon in the Eastern European 
country, the political orientation is still regarded as unacceptable by most Germans. Here, the 
AfD was the first RWP that entered the national parliament since the country’s reunification in 
1989. Nevertheless, although to different extents, the two nations are challenged by the rise of 
RWP. In both national parliaments the main opposition party is a RWP: The AfD in Germany 
since 2017 and Jobbik in Hungary since 2018. This thesis argued that cultural aspects are 
decisive for the success of the two analysed parties. Moreover, it claimed that economic factors 
play a determining role in engendering RWP in Hungary. With this in mind, both theoretical 
approaches account for the rise of RWPPs in both societies albeit in varying degrees.  
 Both the CBT and EIP can account for the increasing success of RWP in the EU and 
the rising popularity of the AfD and Jobbik. By analysing and comparing the two selected 
parties, this thesis investigated the factors needed to be put into account to identify the causes 
of the augmenting support of RWPPs. First, this study analysed the political landscapes of both 
Germany and Hungary. Here, it focused on the changing nature and the policies of the selected 
countries. Whilst Germany is ruled by a coalition of the CDU and SPD, the RWPP Fidesz is in 
power in Hungary. Hence, although both the AfD and Jobbik are the main opposition party of 
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their respective governments, the AfD possesses the unique selling point of being the only 
RWPP in the German parliament. Moreover, since Fidesz has been Hungary’s ruling party 
since 2010, it can be assumed that RWP is deep-rooted in the Eastern nation.  
Second, the thesis examined the role of the EU in the two countries. Thus, it investigated 
the AfD and Jobbik’s policy stances regarding the EU and whether they are in favour of the 
organization or not. As the analysis of the parties’ manifestos identified, both the AfD and 
Jobbik are sceptical towards the institution. However, while the German party would support 
its country’s exit from the EU, its Hungarian counterpart values the socio-economic benefits 
of EU membership alone.  
Third, the economic grievances existing in the two societies were analysed. In 
Germany, economic discontents are rare since the country possesses the EU’s strongest 
economy. Even though social injustices are subjectively perceived by parts of the population, 
the nation performs well in all analysed indices. Hence, it is not only characterized by a high 
economic freedom and low corruption rate, but also by little objective social injustices. In 
comparison to that, economic grievances are common among the Hungarian population. Due 
to the weakness of the country’s economy, the ebbing away of economic and rising levels of 
corruption in the public sector have added insult to a myriad of social injustices faced by its 
citizens. In EIP’s traditions, globalization, increasing economic competition and growing 
income inequality have had a determinant effect on populist attitudes of the right-wing variety. 
Hence, economic downturns are associated with the rise of RWP. In this regard, the EIP 
accounts for Jobbik’s increasing success since economic deprivation is popular among 
Hungarians. This assumption is further strengthened by the party’s electoral performance 
which (as shown in Chapter III) significantly improved after the financial crisis of 2008. In the 
case of Germany, the EIP does not explain sufficiently enough the AfD’s popularity since the 
party’s appeal is not dependent on economic grievances. In contrast to Jobbik, the AfD does 
not centre its policy statements around economic factors but not nationalist and cultural 
sentiments. Furthermore, its electoral performance merely rose after it transformed from an 
anti-EU into an anti-immigration party. 
Fourth, the thesis focused on cultural aspects as well as nationalist grievances. In 
accordance with the CBT, increasing RWP results from value changes that impact Western 
societies since the 1980s. It claims that cultural and nationalist factors propelled RWPPs which 
feed off the peoples’ anxieties of losing their cultures and traditional values. As shown in 
Chapter II, Chapter III and Chapter IV, cultural deprivations are common among the German 
and Hungarian population. In both societies, minority groups face discrimination due to 
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divergent cultural beliefs. Whilst the AfD mainly argues against Muslims, Jobbik confronts 
Roma despite being a long-established minority group in Hungary. In the course of the 2015 
refugee crisis, the antipathies of both populations towards foreigners increased. To protect 
Germany and Hungary’s national identities and avoid a change of values, many people began 
to support RWPPs since they advocate for retention and preservation of domestic traditions. It 
can be said that the CBT offers a satisfactorily plausible account for the turn of events in 
Germany and Hungary regarding the emergence and spread of RWP in both societies.  
Fifth, the media usage of the AfD and Jobbik are worth considering. As shown mainly 
in Chapter III, the parties’ success is not only based on either economic or cultural factors, but 
also on their Social Media performances. Since, media have the power to impact the public 
discourse, both parties utilize online platforms to spread their ideologies. Here, they do not 
only have in common that they are more active on Social Media than other parties in their 
respective parliaments, they also share their stance about traditional media. According to the 
AfD and Jobbik, traditional media are subjective which is why news coverage is falsified and 
detrimental for their popularity  
Sixth, the electoral popularity of the AfD and Jobbik was elucidated upon. This was 
indispensable to test preconceived ideas about the reasons for the parties’ success. As election 
forecasts and results of the past elections showed, the AfD gained significant popularity after 
Germany got hit by the refugee crisis. Since Germany received more applications for asylum 
than any other EU member state and since xenophobic attitudes have been on the rise, it can 
be concluded that cultural grievances have been at the epicentre of the party’s electoral success 
as to assume the role of official opposition in parliament despite having had very marginal 
political influence before. Moreover, the fact that the AfD received less electoral support before 
it transformed from an economic-oriented into a populist-nationalist party in 2015, indicates 
that economic deprivations are not significant considerations behind its rising electoral appeal. 
In comparison to that, Jobbik was not able to expand its support after the refugee crisis in the 
long-term. Since the party’s policies attend to both economic and cultural grievances in equal 
measure, it can be concluded that cultural concerns alone have not decisive for its popularity. 
Rather its policy focusses on economic and cultural grievances have been paramount. From 
this it follows that the CBT as well as the EIP account for the expanding popularity of Jobbik. 
Its manifestos do not place disproportionate focus on economic discontents alone, it also pays 
attention to cultural and nationalist creeping up within the social fabric. In EIP’s traditions, 
economic grievances and social cleavages determine the degree of influence right-wing 
populist parties have. Moreover, in line with the CBT, an impending threat by exogenous 
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factors to the values and traditions of a society provide fertile ground for the proliferation and 
impact of right-wing populist attitudes. Since Germany’s economy remains in a sound state, it 
is not surprising that the AfD has not placed its attention and energy on economic grievances 
(as they remain minimal), the EIP does not account for the party’s rising popularity. On the 
CBT provides a satisfactory account for the party’s success within the wider political landscape 
of Germany.  
 As this thesis investigated, both the CBT and EIP can account for the rising popularity 
of RWP across the EU albeit in varying degrees. Whether cultural or economic grievances have 
been decisive factors behind the popularity of RWPPs remains contingent on the individual 
social conditions and political nomenclatures of each member state. Whilst economically 
strong countries like Germany are mostly challenged by cultural conflicts, economically 
weaker nations such as Hungary are facing cultural and economic grievances in similar 
degrees. Despite the different political histories of the two countries, cultural cleavages in the 
two societies remain undeniably significant considerations for understanding the rise of RWP 
and relative success of right-wing populist parties such as Jobbik and the AfD that either fuel 
or feed off growing populist and right-wing sentiments. It is only in the case of Jobbik that 
economic cleavages become plausible determinants driving the party’s appeal in Hungary and 
the increasingly hostile social fabric towards immigrants the party is exploiting for its narrow 
political gains.  
 
5.4 Considerations for future research  
 
Since the rise of RWP affects all European countries to some extent, the analysis of more 
nations is appropriate for further research to find similarities that apply to a broader scope. For 
instance, a South European or Scandinavian country would be adequate since Germany is 
located in Western and Hungary in Eastern Europe. By including more EU member states the 
analysis would not only focus on a greater area, but will also illustrate the influence of differing 
historical, cultural and economic contexts that propelled modern-day political developments. 
In addition, since RWP has become a global phenomenon, countries from other regions of the 
world can be studied in comparative perspective to the EU’s experiences with right-wing 
populist parties for purposes of drawing parallels. Furthermore, the application of multiple 
research methods is advantageous to comprehend the motivations behind the support of 
RWPPs. For instance, focus group discussions as well as interviews with locals can prove 
helpful.   
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